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CSR performance in China: The role of board gender and foreign ownership 
 
Abstract  
China’s recent promotion of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has coincided with a marked 
increase in the number of Chinese listed firms attracting female board members and foreign equity 
investors. Using Rankins’ (RKS) ratings over the 2009 to 2013 period, we show that greater gender 
balance in top-management supports stronger CSR performance. This finding broadens gender-based 
accounts emphasizing social networks (Westphal and Milton, 2000), Critical Mass Theory (Kramer et 
al., 2006; Bear et al., 2010; and Soares et al., 2011) and team dynamics (Woolley et al., 2010; and 
Hoogendoorn et al., 2013). Findings also reveal stronger CSR performance in firms with a female 
CEO. Female leadership thus appears to be just as important as gender mix in driving CSR change. 
      
CSR ratings are also increasing in foreign ownership levels. We examine whether a political-networking 
motivation underlies foreign investment (Du and Girma, 2010; Liu et al., 2014a; Lin et al., 2015; and 
Jiang and Kim, 2015). We argue that qualified foreign institutional investors (QFIIs) deploy social-
engagement in non-SOEs to build competitive advantage. But in SOEs, where strong political 
networks already exist, QFIIs have less incentive to boost CSR ratings. However, results indicate little 
difference in the social ratings of QFII-invested SOEs and non-SOEs.    
 
Additionally, we confirm the Barnea and Rubin (2010) contention of an inversion in social ratings at 
entrenched managerial ownership levels. Non-linear rating effects also emerge in relation to state 
ownership (Li et al., 2013). Finally, CSR performance exhibits positive (negative) relation with a listed 
entity’s size and age (leverage and lagged return-on-equity) but virtually no connection with 
independent board representation.  
 
Key words: Gender; CSR ratings; social performance; QFII; governance; and China. 
JEL Codes:  G38; J16; J31; M14; and L25 
 
 
Highlights 
 Gender diversity on boards promotes Chinese firms’ social performance. 
 The appointment of female officers to top-level management positions improves CSR ratings. 
 Even higher ratings emerge in firms with gender diverse boards and female leaders. 
 Social ratings are increasing in foreign ownership levels. 
 QFII-invested SOEs and non-SOEs appear little different in terms of social rating.  
 Ratings display negative (positive) relation with a firm’s lagged financial performance and 
leverage (size and age). 
 Ratings have little to no link with independent non-executive board director (INED) presence. 
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CSR performance in China: The role of board gender and foreign ownership 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Much of the recent attention on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has shifted to China. This is 
perhaps not too surprising given the country’s stratospheric growth of the last twenty years or so. 
China’s exploration of CSR has also developed rapidly over the last several years (Shin, 2014). It is 
noteworthy that women and foreign owners have become increasingly important in the Chinese 
governance process during this recent time-frame. We address two very important questions which link 
China’s changing corporate governance arrangements with its push toward more effective CSR-
engagement. First, has the recent surge in female board participation (Lam et al., 2013; and Farag and 
Mallin, 2015) led to an improvement in corporate social ratings? Second, has the emergence of foreign 
ownership, and in particular Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) presence, played a part in 
facilitating greater awareness of CSR? We address both questions by considering Rankins’ (RKS) 
corporate social responsibility ratings for Chinese listed issuers over a recent five year time-frame. 
The state is often regarded as the principal driver of CSR in China (see, for example, Guo et al, 
2009; and Tang, 2012). However, the recent rise in female board representation in Chinese listed firms, 
as well as the marked increase in foreign equity ownership, opens-up new potential channels for CSR-
engagement. The surge in the listing of non-state firms over more or less the same period may have 
given further impetus to such forces. If, as argued in Adams and Funk (2012), women are more 
inclined to focus on qualitative outcomes, increased female board presence may act as a fillip to CSR-
engagement. Woolley et al.’s (2010) study of a “Collective Intelligence Factor” or “C-Factor” is also 
instructive. They report that female presence and team members’ “social sensitivity” boost the “C-
Factor”. Moreover, they find women to be more “socially sensitive” than men.  
Firms with greater female top-management presence may therefore be well-positioned to garner 
enhanced social and financial performance. CSRI (2012) offers compelling global evidence on the latter. 
A slew of US-based studies (Bear et al., 2010; Hafsi and Turgut, 2013; Huang, 2013; Harjoto et al., 
2015; and Gupta et al., 2015) demonstrate stronger CSR engagement in gender-diverse top-
management teams. Such findings counter suggestions of a trade-off between social- and financial 
goals. Greater social-engagement conceivably supports market share and thus adds value. We therefore 
focus on a conception of CSR that principally confers competitive advantage. This assertion is 
consistent with female directors’ greater predilection toward charitable giving (see Williams, 2003), 
while simultaneously exerting tighter control over agency costs (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Liao et al. 
(2016) cement the connection between social responsibility and monitoring by revealing that female 
directors in Chinese firms are more likely to seek external validation of CSR reports. 
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This study’s analysis of top-management officer gender and CSR performance extends the largely 
US-focused literature to an important and materially different context. We also assess whether female 
leadership or board gender diversity imparts greater influence on social ratings. Results suggest that while 
gender diversity promotes Chinese firms’ social performance, even stronger incremental rating effects 
emerge when female leadership accompanies board gender mix. We thus extend the literature on 
female leadership (Chapman, 1975; and Eagly and Carli, 2003) to a new domain. This contribution is 
important given the literature’s emphasis on gender diversity (rather than female leadership) in driving 
CSR performance. Accounts stressing social networks (Westphal and Milton, 2000), Critical Mass 
Theory (Kramer et al., 2006; Bear et al., 2010; and Soares et al., 2011) and team dynamics (Woolley et 
al., 2010; and Hoogendoorn et al., 2013) all allude to the importance of diversity. We also consider 
changes in firms’ CSR ratings following the appointment of female leaders. Findings suggest that such 
appointments cause subsequent positive social ratings change.  
For foreign investors, the incentive to engage in meaningful CSR may depend on the target firm’s 
strategic political affiliations. Liu et al. (2014a) indicate that QFIIs exhibit greater inclination for 
investment in state-controlled listed firms. This finding resonates with a political bridge-building 
account of investment (Du and Girma, 2010; Lin et al., 2015; and Jiang and Kim, 2015, p. 213). We 
conjecture that QFIIs leverage on the political-affiliations they build with state-controllers in SOE 
firms to develop spin-offs beyond the target firm. These benefits potentially include product and 
market licensing agreements in other business areas, as well as greater access to domestic RMB 
funding. In contrast, the weaker political connections evident in non-SOEs may incline foreign 
investors to promote CSR much more strongly in building-on and extending existing networks in the 
target firm. Such activity might be useful in procuring firm-level subsidies, access to bank funding, and 
so on. As these benefits should already be in place in most SOEs, the motivation for foreign entry into 
SOE and non-SOE entities is thus quite different. Additionally, QFIIs likely play a subordinate role to 
the state in the promotion of CSR in SOE firms. In non-SOEs, QFIIs perhaps perceive greater scope 
for meaningful CSR impact. Despite the compelling nature of such arguments, results offer only 
marginal support. Nonetheless, CSR ratings are increasing in the proportion of equity held by all 
foreign parties. This more general facet of foreign ownership extends Asian-market evidence (see Oh 
et al., 2011 for Korea). It also complements work on the influence of offshore suppliers and customers 
on CSR (Tsoi, 2010; and Cheung et al., 2014a), by exploring a much more direct channel of influence.    
Managerial ownership also impacts on CSR performance (Atkinson and Galaskiewicz, 1988; 
Johnson and Greening, 1999; Barnea and Rubin, 2010; Oh et al., 2011; and Soliman et al., 2012). In 
particular, CSR ratings invert at high levels of insider ownership. Results in this area largely accord with 
contentions in Barnea and Rubin (2010). They argue that managers “overinvest’ in CSR to promote 
social standing. But at high levels of ownership, managerial insiders bear disproportionately more of 
the drag-effect of social-expenditures on shareholder value. Entrenched managerial ownership thus 
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militates against CSR commitment. Non-linear associations with CSR are also evident in relation to 
state ownership (Li and Zhang, 2010; and Dam and Scholtens, 2012).    
In terms of second-order findings, CSR ratings exhibit strong positive connection with firm age 
(time since listing), asset value and board size. In contrast, ratings display negative relation with a firm’s 
lagged financial performance and leverage. Our study of year-on-year CSR ratings also allows for a 
clearer and more robust assessment of financial performance effects on Chinese firms’ CSR activities 
(Li and Zhang, 2010; Li et al., 2013, Rutledge et al., 2014; and Farag et al., 2015).  
Finally, CSR ratings exhibit little to no association with independent non-executive board director 
(INED) presence. This evidence contrasts with findings elsewhere, stressing INEDs’ promotion of 
philanthropic and socially-based mores (Ibrahim et al., 2003: 399; Harjoto and Jo, 2011; and Cuadrado-
Ballesteros et al., 2015). As argued in Yu and Zheng (2014), INEDs’ weak bargaining-power 
undermines their mooted stewardship role in the Chinese market context. 
 
2. Literature review and research questions    
2.1. Background 
 
Corporate bodies increasingly face stakeholder and external pressures to comply with sustainability 
norms. Such pressures have perhaps intensified in the aftermath of the Global financial Crisis 
(González and Martinez, 2004). Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) thus constitutes a major area of 
disclosure and compliance for publicly-listed entities. As Almunawar and Low (2014) attest, the 
overarching objective is one of encouraging both corporate growth and wider sustainability issues.  
The Chinese government has also been keen to promote CSR in its own market-place. Internal and 
external demands for greater disclosure on pollution, food quality, resource depletion and carbon 
emissions have also forced China to develop a range of localized CSR standards (see Gugler and Shi, 
2009: p. 15; and Shin 2014). CSR now constitutes an important public policy issue for China, most 
especially for its state-owned and sponsored firms. Longstanding state support for CSR promotion has 
in fact been a characteristic of some of the world’s leading contributors to sustainability, most notably 
Denmark (Vallentin, 2015) and the Scandinavian countries more generally.1 Indeed, CSR may serve in 
spurring innovation and competitiveness at the macroeconomic-level (Boulata and Pitelis, 2014).   
The bottom-line is that Chinese entities now face greater pressure to engage in CSR. But are such 
initiatives gaining momentum and finding broader penetration? 2  Yu and Choi (2016) argue that 
stakeholder pressure must be complemented by state-intervention and educational-initiatives 
                                                          
1 The 2003 National Corporate Responsibility Index highlights Scandinavia’s longstanding leadership role in CSR, with four of 
the top-five hailing from this region.See Page 28 of the Responsibility Competitive Index (2003). More recently, Cai et al. 
(2016) identify factors relevant to cross-country variation in social reporting.     
2 See Lin (2010) for a detailed overview of the level of acceptance of China’s CSR policies in earlier years. 
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emphasizing the vale-enhancing role of CSR.3 4 China’s progression to a mixed economy also means 
that the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges now accommodate large numbers of privately-
controlled firms. The situation 10 years earlier was radically different, with state-controlled enterprises 
overwhelmingly dominant in turnover and value terms. The recent surge in the listing of privately-
controlled (i.e., non-state–owned) enterprises invites interesting comparison of SOE and non-SOE 
influence on CSR. Questions of board gender influence also arise in this context, given non-state firms’ 
greater support and promotion of female leaders (Lam et al., 2013). Foreign ownership, too, has been 
on the rise. Large numbers of Chinese listed firms now house sizeable foreign minority equity stakes. It 
is thus timely to assess whether blended ownership promotes more effective CSR-engagement. Gender 
and foreign ownership occupy centre-stage in such deliberations. 
This study’s focus is on a broad-based composite measure of CSR performance, as provided by 
China’s independent social ratings agency, RKS. As argued later in this paper (see Section 3), RKS 
scores impound information on a range of social reporting matters. Among other things, these areas 
cover an entity’s (1) compliance with environmental regulations (2) support of worker and consumer 
rights, and (3) philanthropic/charitable commitments. The CSR literature also emphasizes these three 
broad strands of activity. Studies that stress the role of CSR in environmental-protection include Tang 
and Tang (2012), Huang (2013) and Farag et al. (2015). In respect of the second area, on labour and 
consumer rights, Lin (2010) explains how CSR interacts with Chinese laws and regulations in 
promoting workers’ welfare and rights. Additionally, Delios et al. (2009) stress CSR in alleviating food 
safety issues. More broadly, Tian et al. (2011) demonstrate how CSR disclosure functions in refining 
consumer perceptions of product quality. Investigations emphasizing the philanthropic component of 
Chinese CSR-engagement include Williams (2003), Wang and Qian (2011), Jia and Zhang (2012, 2013 
& 2014), Chen at al. (2015), Lin et al. (2015) and Cheng et al. (2016).  
Most studies, including those mentioned in the foregoing, recognize that CSR is a multi-faceted 
concept, with a focus on environmental-protection, consumer and labour welfare, corporate 
philanthropy, and a host of related areas. However, some evidence suggests that entities stress CSR as a 
competitive profit-enhancing tool rather than a counter to social and environmental ills (Graafland and 
Zhang, 2014). Nonetheless, Zhang et al (2014) emphasize the importance of CSR in legitimizing 
business in an environment where “Moral Degradation” potentially undermines corporate credibility. 
They characterize such “Degradation” in terms of corruption, capital market malpractice, unsafe 
consumables and other market-based irregularities (see Zheng et al., 2014a, page 405).                 
                                                          
3 Tang and Tang (2012) identify government and industry competition as drivers in inducing compliance with Chinese 
environmental standards. There is also debate on the extent of such value enhancement. As a reference point, Clacher and 
Hagendorff (2012) observe mixed reactions to the announcement of a firm’s inclusion in the UK FTSE4Good CSR index.  
4 CSR disclosure narrows information gaps and promotes price-discovery. He et al. (2013) identify an inverse link between 
CSR ratings and the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Analyst coverage also bolsters ratings (Zhang et al., 2015). 
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Finally, and as an overarching consideration, we emphasize that China is a relative newcomer to the 
field of CSR-engagement. Its development of localized standards, and push to implement meaningful 
CSR change, has only gained momentum in more recent years. There are therefore obvious problems 
in extrapolating findings from earlier cross-sectional analyses of CSR in China. 
  
 
2.2. Research questions 
 
Our first research question addresses the influence of board officer gender on CSR performance. 
At a fundamental level, gender helps explain wide-ranging differences in social preferences, attitudes 
and psychological phenomena (see, for example, Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001; DellaVigna et al. 
2013; Schwartz and Rubel, 2005; and Croson, and Gneezy, 2009). As relevant to CSR, Beutel and 
Marini (1995) observe that women are often more compassionate and less materialistic than men. 
Additionally, Adams and Funk (2012) note that female CEOs are more receptive to social and 
community needs, and are thus less likely to trade-off social activities against bottom-line outcomes.             
US-based empirical accounts suggest a strong connection between female board presence and both 
philanthropic performance specifically (Wang and Coffee, 1992; and Williams, 2003) and social 
performance more generally (Bear et al., 2010; Hafsi and Turgot, 2013; Huang, 2013; and Harjoto et al., 
2015). Nonetheless, Grosser and Moon (2005) suggest limits to gender equality in shaping CSR policy. 
Rao and Tilt (2016) also argue that the effect of gender on CSR performance is still at an exploratory 
stage. Cross-market studies also inform that gender is a key demographic in driving socially-responsible 
investment (Cheah et al., 2011).   
We offer important development of the literature on women and CSR by distinguishing between 
gender leadership and diversity. Our first hypothesis (H1a) asserts that the role of gender in promoting 
CSR is most keenly felt where women occupy top-management or leadership positions.     
 
H1a. Higher CSR ratings are apparent in female-led firms.  
 
For the purposes of this study, we define leadership in relation to one or more of the following 
positions: CEO, vice-CEO, chair and vice-chair. In deepening our assessment of this theme, we extend 
cross-sectional analysis (H1a) of female leadership effects on CSR to a time-series setting (H1b). 
Specifically, does appointment of a female leader impact on a firm’s subsequent CSR performance? 
Hypothesis H1b contends in the affirmative that it does.   
 
H1b. A firm’s CSR rating increases following the appointment of a female board officer. 
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Confirmation of both cross-sectional (H1a) and time-series (H1b) associations would offer 
compelling evidence of a positive female gender leadership effect on CSR performance. 
Most studies on women and CSR focus on issues of board gender diversity, rather than leadership 
per se. The proportion of female board directors typically captures board gender diversity (see, for 
example, Bear et al., 2010; Hafsi andTurgot, 2013; and Huang, 2013). Accordingly, hypothesis H2 
considers the relation between board gender diversity and CSR activity in the context of China.     
 
H2. CSR ratings are increasing in firms with greater board gender diversity (i.e., a higher proportion of female board  
directors). 
 
Our prime focus, given its importance in extending the literature, is on hypothesis H1 (rather than 
H2). It is also conceivable that enhanced CSR performance derives from gender leadership and not 
necessarily gender board diversity. Diverse boards without female leadership may be less receptive to 
social performance than boards with both (i.e., female leadership and diversity).  
The background theoretical literature emphasizes diversity as the overarching factor. For example, 
Westphal and Milton (2000) argue that a minority board member’s influence hinges on “social network 
ties” with the majority. Critical Mass Theory (CMT) prescriptions are also relevant. Kramer et al.’s 
(2006) US-based interview evidence suggests stronger governance in firms with at least three female 
board members. Work in social philanthropy (Soares et al., 2011) also supports the CMT proposition. 
Bear et al. (2010) report strong positive association between KLD-CSR ratings and number of female 
board members. They argue that greater female board presence promotes alternative “perspectives” 
and “issues” (Page 211). Boulouta (2013) argues that female board members may be particularly 
effective in remedying or mitigating the effects of “negative” corporate activities.    
The literature also suggests that gender diversity acts in boosting mentorship channels (Terjesen et 
al., 2009), enhancing disclosure (Gul et al., 2011) and supporting firm-level innovation (Torchia et al., 
2011). Increased gender leadership may also serve as a catalyst for diversity (Tate and Yang, 2015).         
Additionally, the team dynamics literature emphasizes how gender balance imparts cognitive power 
to group decision-making (Woolley et al., 2010), thereby enhancing financial performance 
(Hoogendoorn et al., 2013). However, Adams and Ferreira (2009) caution that while greater diversity 
promotes better firm-level monitoring, it may not necessarily boost corporate value. Similarly, Gupta et 
al.’s (2015) ten-year study (2003-12) of US listed firms reveals that while board diversity garners 
increased social returns the same may not necessarily hold in respect of financial returns. Moreover, 
Sila et al. (2016) show that female board presence has limited effect on a firm’s equity risk level. Faccio 
et al. (2016) demonstrate that female-led firms fare better in survival terms than male-led entities.     
Our second major research question addresses how foreign ownership impacts on CSR 
performance. This issue is important given the quite recent introduction of foreign owners into listed 
companies on the Chinese mainland. Cheung et al. (2014a) report that Chinese firms’ CSR 
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performance is increasing in their degree of internationalization. The underlying premise is that 
international counter-parties, especially those from developed markets, possess longer-standing and 
more-ingrained attitudes towards CSR. Cheung et al. (2014a) argue that foreign parties demand 
Chinese suppliers’ compliance with such CSR norms. In terms of the geographical sourcing of 
revenues, they report stronger “internationalization” effects in non-SOEs. 
Relative to overseas suppliers, foreign owners potentially offer a more direct and incisive channel 
for effecting CSR change. Offshore owners share in the financial success of the entities they invest-in. 
Where investment stakes are material, they also exert direct influence on board and governance 
activities (Oxelheim and Randoy, 2005). Such influence is perhaps most keenly felt when domestically-
listed companies seek an overseas cross-listing. Regulatory standards in offshore markets like Hong 
Kong (for Chinese issuers with H-share listings) and the US (for ADRs representing underlying H-
shares) invite important ‘bonding’ effects (Coffee, 1999; and Stulz, 1999). Li et al. (2015) argue that 
foreign investors’ interpretation of firm-specific information may enhance the issuing entity’s corporate 
governance. Building on this literature, we argue that cross-listing offers a conduit for stronger social-
engagement. An overseas listing may also promote voluntary disclosure (Hope et al., 2013), and thus 
spur companies to engage in social reporting at levels above formal standards. Additional monitoring 
from overseas regulators, institutions and analysts potentially serves in promoting disclosure quality 
(see, for example, Karolyi, 2006).    
Except for Boubakri et al. (2016), the link between cross-listings and CSR practice is largely 
unexplored. Chapple and Moon (2005) offer indirect guidance in relation to “international” Asian 
companies. They distinguish “domestic” and “international” companies in terms of export market 
focus and headquarter-base. However, only minor differences emerge in such firms’ CSR practices.  
The present study assesses “internationalization” effects on CSR ratings in relation to foreign 
investor participation. Specifically, hypothesis H3a contends that,     
 
H3a. A firm’s CSR rating is increasing in its foreign ownership level. 
 
We capture foreign ownership in terms of (1) qualified foreign institutional investor (QFII) 
presence and (2) whether or not an issuer has offshore cross-listing.  
The empirical evidence offers only limited guidance in respect of H3a. Only a few studies address 
the role of QFIIs in relation to the governance and performance of Chinese firms. Beatson (2014), for 
example, reveal that QFIIs exert positive effects on Tobin’s Q and ROA levels. Huang and Zhu 
(2015), within the context of China’s recent split-share reforms, show that QFIIs promotes minority 
investor interests. Mixed cross-country findings emerge when considering foreign investment outside 
the QFII realm. For respective Korean and Egyptian firm data, Oh et al. (2011) and Soliman et al. 
(2012) report higher CSR ratings in firms with greater foreign and institutional holdings. In contrast, 
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US evidence highlights either weak (Barnea and Rubin, 2010) or negative (Borghesi et al., 2014) 
institutional holding effects. Dam and Scholtens’ (2012) European market analysis also reveals limited 
association. However, Wang and Chen (2016) find enhanced social performance in Chinese-listed firms 
accommodating greater institutional investment.  
China’s QFII Scheme is one of the few avenues available to foreign parties for A-share investment. 
However, ceilings on allocation as well as investment limits in individual stocks constrain investor 
access.5 Moreover, the generally small quotas granted individual QFIIs often result in a splintering 
effect in foreign ownership within a given stock.6 It is thus conceivable that China’s QFII Scheme may 
not yet have attained sufficient scale to induce appreciable change in invested-firms’ social policies. 
Some QFIIs may also view the Scheme as a political networking tool. This argument resonates with 
Liu et al. (2014a) evidence that QFII funds prefer investment in state-invested entities. Procurement of 
a “red hat” (Du and Girma, 2010) serves in building business opportunities with the Chinese 
government, extracting regulatory advantage and accessing state-controlled bank funding. If incentives 
are aligned as such, QFII participation is unlikely to generate major change in an underlying invested-
entity’s social-engagement. Rejection of H3 could be predicated on such grounds. 
Foreign parties may play a supplementary role in China’s push for cleaner energy. The related FDI 
literature is instructive. Liang (2008) argues that foreign investors on the one hand might relocate less-
clean production to regulatory-light overseas jurisdictions. On the other, she argues that home-based 
regulatory norms might condition an FDI’s behaviour overseas. Liang’s (2008) China-based evidence is 
consistent with the latter so-called “halo” (Zarsky, 1999) effect. Foreign investment could also exert 
greater influence on the adoption of “clean” technology in non-state firms. Jia (2012) reveals that the 
career prospects of political decision-makers may inhibit switches from “dirty” to “clean” technologies. 
Nonetheless, Zheng et al. (2014b, page 62) indicate that senior political officials increasingly assess 
lower-ranking personnel in terms of broader societal and “sustainability” issues.7 
Foreign investor effects may also differ across SOE and non-SOE firms. In particular, we 
conjecture via Hypothesis H3b that foreign parties exert greater influence on a listed firm’s CSR-
engagement and social policies when the firm is privately-owned. Accordingly, H3b asserts that,  
 
H3b. Foreign owners’ impact on CSR ratings is more keenly felt in SOE than non-SOE firms. 
 
                                                          
5 As indicated in SSE (2016), the China Securities Regulatory Commission has until quite recently (July 2012) limited total 
QFII investment in an individual stock to a maximum of 20 percent of its outstanding shares. Reuters (2012) also reveals 
that the whole QFII Scheme captures just 1 percent of the value of the overall A- share market.     
6 To illustrate, the CSRC (2012) identified, as of 23 March 2012, 129 approved QFIIs with US$24.550 million of aggregate 
quota. This collective amount points to an average individual QFII quota of only US$190.3 million.      
7 Jia, Guo and Marinova (2013), in relation to China’s “Clean Development Mechanism”, stress the pivotal role of the 
state in both its application and regional focus. In the current section’s discussions, we also leave to one side issues relating 
to foreign owners’ impact on financial performance and investment efficiency (Chen et al., 2014). Notably, Chen, Sun, Tang 
and Wu (2011) observe state controllers’ deleterious effects on investment efficiency.   
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
11 
 
In state-controlled firms, foreign parties may seek to build political networks and bridges with 
government-affiliated parties. The benefits from doing so may be multi-faceted, ranging from licensing 
and regulatory advantage to improved market access (Du and Girma, 2010). Where such a raison d’etre 
exists, QFIIs might trade-off the target asset’s specific characteristics against wider benefits gleaned 
from engagement with state-related parties. In non-SOEs, this argument is less compelling, due to 
private owners’ greater distance from the PRC state. Accordingly, QFIIs may pay more attention to 
firm specific attributes, like social ratings, when investing in non-SOEs. 
The empirical evidence on QFII investment choices informs Hypothesis H3b. In particular, Liu et 
al. (2014a) reveal that QFIIs have a greater predilection to equity investment in state-owned firms, and 
that participation is increasing in the target entity’s state ownership level. They find that the investment 
preference of QFII’s contrasts with domestic Chinese fund managers who gravitate toward investment 
in non-state (i.e., legal-person controlled) A-share firms.     
 The Chinese state is also central in promoting other, wider facets of CSR. Related evidence 
suggests a greater concentration of CSR activity in listed SOEs, relative to privately-controlled public 
entities (Tang, 2012). For SOEs, preferential access to bank and equity funding (Cull et al., 2015) may 
hinge on compliance with government edicts on social matters.8 However, only limited evidence exists 
to connect state-ownership with CSR-engagement. For European markets, Dam and Scholtens (2012) 
report broadly ‘neutral” state-ownership effects. In respect of China and specifically 2008 SNAI CSR 
rankings, Li and Zhang (2010), report higher ratings in SOEs with greater government ownership. For 
privately-controlled entities they find that more diffuse ownership boosts CSR ratings.9 In addition, 
Guo et al.’s (2009) examination of non-listed Chinese companies reveals that SOEs are much more 
likely to disclose CSR information than foreign-invested and privately-controlled entities. In another 
study, Li et al. (2013) report that state ownership mediates the positive link between financial and CSR 
performance. They deploy 2008 RLCCW ratings for Chinese listed issuers, 10 and reveal that CSR 
scores exhibit an inverse relation with an ROA*SOE dummy interaction term. Such evidence suggests 
a non-linear relation between CSR ratings and state-ownership. Specifically, China’s most politically-
strategic entities likely face greater pressure to conform to state directives on CSR matters. We 
therefore anticipate a positive effect on social ratings at high levels of government ownership. At such 
levels, an agency account of CSR-engagement, in which rent-seeking behaviour drives social 
expenditures (Barrios et al., 2014), is less compelling. Accordingly, hypothesis H4 asserts,       
 
H4. The relation between state ownership and CSR performance is non-monotonic. A negative relation gives way to a  
positive one at high (or concentrated) levels of state ownership. 
 
                                                          
8 See Tang and Li (2009) for CSR trends in China and Waworuntu et al. (2014) for the ASEAN region.     
9 Zu and Song (2009) add to this evidence by revealing that managers from small, state-owned entities often seek-out 
higher ratings. They ascribe this motivation to the economic benefits higher ratings generate.  
10 Li et al. (2013) cite the following link for RLCCW details: http://wenku.baidu.com/view/3d1f846b561252d380eb6ef2.html.    
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Our analysis offers in-depth assessment of the state ownership-CSR nexus. Rather than focusing 
on just one year of CSR data, as in Li and Zhang (2010) and Li et al.(2013),  the present study assesses 
five consecutive years of data, 2009-2013. 
The final hypothesis assesses the link between managerial ownership and CSR activity. Barnea and 
Rubin (2010) argue that managers “overinvest’ in CSR so as to promote social standing and visibility. 
They suggest that higher CSR ratings afford insider-managers “personal benefits”. However, a trade-
off arises because of the adverse effect increased CSR expenditures imparts on the value of managerial 
insiders’ equity holdings. Utilizing this premise, we argue that managers gain from CSR-engagement at 
low to medium equity ownership levels. Beyond a certain equity threshold, their engagement in social 
expenditure weakens. In the spirit of Barnea and Rubin (2010), Hypothesis H5 below posits a non-
linear managerial ownership-CSR rating relation. 
  
H5. A positive relation exists between social ratings and managerial stakes at low to medium levels of ownership. 
However, this association inverts at high managerial ownership levels.  
  
  Evidence, for respective US, Korean and Egyptian study samples, in Barnea and Rubin (2010), 
Oh et al. (2011) and Soliman et al. (2012), highlights a negative link between managerial ownership and 
CSR ratings.11 Support for H4 could arise if CSR expenditure conceals agency issues (Prior et al., 2008; 
Martinez-Ferrero and Garcia-Sanchez, 2015). At low levels of ownership, managers may be relatively 
free to combine CSR and earnings smoothing activities. But at higher levels, “impression management” 
(Davidson et al, 2004) becomes far more costly for insider-managers. 
CSR expenditure may also function as a political-bonding mechanism (Lin et al., 2015; and Jiang 
and Kim, 2015, p. 213). Hypothesis H5 also accommodates such arguments. Managers within smaller 
entities trade-off the political benefits gained from their firm’s CSR expenditure against the cost impact 
on underlying equity value. At high ownership, managers experience negative marginal returns from 
this trade-off and thus curtail CSR expenditure. If CSR expenditure helps garner state funding and 
market access, negative marginal returns may only materialize at high managerial equity levels.  
We investigate Hypotheses H1-H6 after due control for firm performance. Mixed findings emerge 
in the literature on the connection between firm profitability and CSR disclosure in Chinese firms.12 
For privately-controlled listed entities, Li and Zhang (2010) reveal a strong positive link between a 
firm’s CSR rating and lagged return-on-equity (ROE).13 In respect of SOEs, they observe a statistically 
insignificant association. For large-cap SOE firms, Rutledge et al. (2014) identify an inverse CSR rating-
ROE association. They account for such an outcome in terms of the additional social and 
environmental costs deriving from CSR disclosure. Similarly, Farag et al. (2015) reveal weaker social 
                                                          
11 As further background, Johnson and Greening (1999) show that managerial stakes have a positive link with a “product” 
dimension of social performance; but a non-directional one with “people”-based measures. 
12 See, for example, Bai and Chang’s (2015, p. 506) commentary on this issue.    
13 Guo et al.’s (2009) analysis of non-listed Dalian firms indicates CSR activity is increasing in profitability. 
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performance in firms with higher ROA numbers. They determine causality from financial to social 
performance. 14  Elsewhere, Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014) find that firms investing in CSR often 
experience subsequent deterioration in ROA. Deng et al. (2014) reveal that CSR-invested firms are 
more likely to complete corporate acquisitions and garner positive long-run stock returns.   
In terms of disclosure activity, Cheung, Lin and Wong (2015) show, for 2008 and 2009 CSR 
reporting in China, that disclosure is increasing in prior year’s financial performance level. ROA figures 
also appear higher in the year immediately following disclosure. A myriad of reasons exist for CSR 
disclosure. At one level, it serves as a political-bonding tool (Lin et al., 2015). This notion accords with 
Wang and Qian’s (2011) evidence that listed Chinese non-SOEs gain more in terms of “political 
resources” from philanthropic activities than SOEs. Greater social-engagement also potentially 
facilitate better trade credit terms for non-SOEs (Zhang et al., 2014), stronger access to bank funding 
(Chen et al., 2015) and supports customer perceptions (Deng, 2012).15 
 
3. Sample selection and data collection 
 
The research questions we advance assess the extent to which board officer gender and foreign 
ownership shape CSR performance in Chinese joint-stock companies. We address these issues by 
constructing a sample of firms with A-share listing presence on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges for each of five years, 2009-13. All sample firms (n= 2,412) receive social ratings from 
Rankins (RKS), the leading independent CSR entity in China.16  RKS provides yearly CSR ratings, with 
ratings available from 2009. It covers all listed firms issuing CSR reports in China. Table 2a reports 
sample selection details and the year-by-year distribution of observations.  
Our analysis requires complete data for all key variables. Accordingly, some CSRD=1 cases are lost 
from analysis due to missing information on one or more of the explanatory variables in our principal 
regression models (see Equations 1 & 2 in Section 4). This procedure allows for a uniform number of 
observations across all tables and regressions. It results, as shown in Table 2a, in a contraction in 
CSRD=1 cases of only 3.5%. The loss of firm-year observations is principally confined to CSRD=0 
values. As our explicit focus is on CSR reporting entities (i.e., CSRD=1 firm-year cases), the procedure 
has limited impact on results but provides for consistency of interpretation across regressions. 
RKS determines corporate ratings in relation to three principal areas of reporting, defined under 
the headings Macrocosm, Content and Technique. The first of these relates to the overall strategy, 
                                                          
14 They examine 149 non-financial companies contained within the Shanghai SSE 180 index. They account for the latter 
in terms of the Preston and O'Bannon (1997: 423) “Managerial Opportunism Hypothesis” (Page 9). 
15  Further afield, Samy et al. (2010) argue that CSR investment protects British firms’ competitive advantage while 
satisfying stakeholder demands. Xu et al. (2015) observe significantly lower capital cost in firms with stronger CSR scores. 
They indicate that such scores yield greater cost of capital benefit for non-SOEs. Similarly, Ye and Zhang (2011) show that 
CSR disclosure reduces Chinese firms’ debt funding cost, so long as CSR investment is at sub-optimal levels. Moreover, if 
CSR disclosure reinforces overall firm governance, it should also be value-enhancing (Cheung et al., 2014b). 
16 http://www.rksratings.com/. 
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governance and information disclosure channels deployed in an entity’s social reporting activities. The 
third dimension, “Technique”, relates to the depth, coverage and consistency of reporting. “Content” 
is arguably the most important of the three areas. Four principal dimensions underlie this component. 
RKS defines these in relation to an entity’s: (1) “Economic Performance”, (2) “Labour and Human 
Rights”, (3) “Consumption”, and (4) “Community Participation”.17 
 RKS’s CSR rating of an entity is thus a composite measure reflecting an amalgam of social 
reporting issues and factors. Among other things, ratings encapsulate an entity’s orientation, strategy 
and ability to meet environmental concerns, as well as its focus on philanthropic and charitable works.  
Recent academic investigations highlight the prominence of RKS in China in guiding investors’ 
awareness of the quality and content of listed firms’ overall social reporting activities (Marquis and 
Qian, 2014; Hung et al., 2015; Lau et al., 2016; and Luo et al., 2016).     
Descriptive statistics in Table 2b highlight the major differences between firms that disclose CSR 
reports (CSRD=1) and those that do not (CSRD=0). For the five-year period, the disclosure rate 
appears to be just under 30 percent (see Table 2a). Rated firms typically exhibit much higher state 
ownership than non-rated firms. For instance, the median percentage for disclosing firms is 26.0% of 
total ownership, as compared to 2.2% for non-disclosing firms. CSRD=1 firms are also generally larger 
in terms of Firm Size (measured by the natural log of total assets and board size. They are also more 
mature (Age) and more highly-geared (LEV) than CSRD=0 firms. Additionally, and consistent with 
Wang and Chen (2016), QFII presence is more readily apparent in firms disclosing CSR reports. 
We utilize the WIND Info database 18  in determining the identities of A-listed firms and their 
ownership characteristics. The WIND Info database and the GTA-CSMAR platform feature for firm-
level accounting data. 19  Stock market, accounting and finance-related studies of China commonly 
employ one or other database (see Liu et al., 2014a). 
 
4. Research design and description of variables   
 
We offer the following lead-lag panel regression model to test our five hypotheses. 
 
      
                                                           
                                                               
                                                                                    
                                                          
17 For specific details, see http://www.rksratings.com/index.php/Index/Report/index. The pdf file of interest is: 
“MCT社会责任报告评级工具 2012_1.2i 版本 2012-11-30”. 
18 Wind Information Co., Limited: http://www.wind.com.cn/en/ 
19 http://www.gtadata.com/products/plist.aspx  
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         (Equation 1) 
 
Where CSRRit is the CSR rating of firm i in year t;; FCEOit-1 is a dummy variable for female CEO or vice-CEO 
(1=female CEO or vice-CEO; and 0 if both are male); FChair it-1 is a dummy variable for female Chair or vice-
Chair (1=female Chair or vice-Chair; and 0 if both are male); IDit-1 is the percentage of independent board 
directors of firm i in year t-1; Dualityit-1 is a dummy equal to 1 if CEO and board chair are the same person and 0 
otherwise; Board Sizeit-1  is the natural log of the total number of directors of firm i in year t-1; Managerial Sizeit-1  is 
the natural log of the total number of executive managers of firm i in year t-1; Managerial Ownershipit-1 is the 
ownership percentage by executive managers of firm i in year t-1; State Ownershipit-1  is the state ownership 
percentage of firm i year t-1; SOEit-1 is a dummy variable that is 1 for state-owned enterprises and 0 for non-state-
owned enterprises in year t-1; H10it-1  is the Herfindahl index for ownership concentration (= squared sum of the 
percentage of shares held by the ten largest shareowners) of firm i year t-1; Qfiidit-1 is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 for firms with foreign shareholders in year t-1 and 0, otherwise; AGEit is the natural logarithm of the 
firm’s listing age of firm i in year t; LEVit is the leverage ratio of firm i calculated as the ratio of total debts scaled 
by total assets in year t; ROEit is the return on equity of firm i in year t; Firm Sizeit is the natural logarithm of firm 
i’s total assets in year t; SHSE it is a dummy for place of listing, equal to 1 if the sample firm i is listed on SHSE 
and 0 if  listed on SZSE; Overseasit is a dummy for cross-listing, equal to 1 if firm i is cross-listed overseas and 0 if 
listed only domestically; and IndustryDum refers to 15 industry dummies in respect of 16 identified business sectors.  
 
Board gender diversity (FD) is pivotal in Equation 1. This variable captures the proportion of 
female board directors. Its inclusion reflects the purported role of female support mechanisms (Bell, 
2005), social networks (Westphal and Milton, 2000), Critical Mass Theory (Kramer et al., 2006; Bear et 
al., 2010; and Soares et al., 2011) and team dynamics (Woolley et al., 2010; and Hoogendoorn et al., 
2013) in shaping the quality and content of social reporting activities. The FD measurement form for 
gender balance features widely elsewhere (for cross-country comparison, see Terjesen and Singh, 2008). 
Liu et al. (2014b) also report higher return-on-sales and return-on-assets figures in Chinese-listed 
entities that possess a greater proportion of female board directors. 
In Equation 1, a current-year’s CSR rating is explained by prior year-end explanatory variable 
values. Given our focus in hypothesis H1a on female leadership, we include variables FCEOit-1 and 
FChairit- The former is a dummy for an entity with female CEO and/or vice-CEO in year t-1. Similarly, 
FChairit-1 receives value one for firms with a female chair and/or vice-chair in year t-1.  
In additional regressions (Appendix 2) we also replace FCEOit-1 and FChairit-1 by more narrowly-
focused measures, namely FCEO1it-1 and FChai1rit-1. The latter capture dummies excluding female vice-
CEOs and vice-Chairs. Table 1 reveals respective means for FCEOit-1 and FChairit-1 of 0.34 and 0.09. 
Therefore, 34 (9) percent of sample firms have at least one female person occupying the role of CEO 
or vice-CEO (Chair or vice-Chair). Appendix 1a sets-out additional descriptive statistics on FCEOit-1 
and FChairit-1. Female CEOs appear to be more common among non-SOE firms than SOEs. The 
respective means for the period 2009-13 are 9 and 4 percent. These levels appear similar to those 
reported for years just prior to 2009. For instance, Lam et al. (2013: 1143) report female CEO 
participation rates for 2008 of 8.3 and 3.5 percent in respect of non-SOE and SOE entities. They 
demarcate firms into SOE and non-SOEs in terms of a state ownership threshold of five percent. 
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The present study focuses on one principal board demographic: gender. We emphasize this 
governance characteristic in terms of both diversity and leadership. Our analysis is largely silent on other 
demographic measures of heterogeneity such as board ethnicity. Above all, the vast majority of board 
members in Chinese A-listed firms are Chinese nationals. Some studies elsewhere, particularly for the 
US, identify board ethnicity as an important dimension of diversity and thus a possible determinant of 
social performance (Hafsi and Turgut, 2013; Harjoto et al, 2015; and Gupta et al., 2015).  
The Chinese state’s role in directing and promoting CSR is pivotal (Tang, 2012). Accordingly 
Equation 1 incorporates either continuous variable State Ownership or dummy SOE. Inclusion of 
such effects allows for direct examination of hypothesis H4. Dummy variable SOE receives value one 
where the “ultimate owner” of a listed entity is state-related. We follow Wang, Wong and Xia’s (2008) 
prescription by recognizing SOEs as entities where the “Ultimate Owner” (controller) or largest 
investor holds 20 percent or more of outstanding stock. As reported in Wang et al. (2008: 116), 
Chinese listed firms’ must report “Ultimate Owner” information in annual reports. Our continuous 
state-ownership variable, State Ownership, captures the proportion of outstanding shares held by state-
parties.  Table 1d reports an SO mean of around 17.5 percent. As reference, Lam et al. (2013: 1137) 
document a general decline in this mean over the 2000-2008 (from 35.2 to 21.9 percent). We confirm a 
continuation in this trend, specifically between 2009 and 2013. Much of the explanation for the drop 
on mean SOE levels is due to greater numbers of non-state firms listing in more recent years. This 
trend owes much to the creation of the Shenzhen Stock Exchanges’ hi-tech ChiNext board (in 2009) 
and the growing maturity of its SME boards (introduced in 2004).20           
For foreign ownership effects (hypothesis H3a), Equation 1 incorporates two variables, Qfiid and 
Overseas. Variable Managerial Ownership features in respect of hypothesis H5. We also control for 
important governance effects, such as the proportion of INEDs on boards (ID) and the presence of a 
unified CEO/chair (Duality). Lattemann et al. (2009: 431) posit greater transparency, and thus stronger 
CSR-engagement, in firms that separate CEO and chair positions.  
Widespread evidence suggests that corporate size and financial resources matter in promoting 
effective social-engagement (Adams and Hardwick, 1998; Cormier et al., 2005; Reverte, 2009; and 
Gallo and Christensen, 2011). Equation 1 thus includes controls for board, management and firm size 
(Board Size, Managerial Size & Firm Size). The period since a firm’s date of listing (Age) controls for 
an entity’s maturity (Withisuphakorn and Jiraporn, 2016). 
Equation 1 also takes account of a firm’s ownership concentration (H10). Consistent with prior 
studies, an approximation of the Herfindahl index captures such concentration (Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002; and Li et al., 2013). Li and Zhang (2010) demonstrate that ownership concentration improves 
                                                          
20 As further reference points, McGuinness et al. (2015: 1008) report a state ownership mean for 2000-8 of approximately 
31.4 percent (n = 11,687), while Hou et al. (2012) for 2001-8 document a mean of 31.8 percent (n=9,871).    
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social ratings in SOEs while weakening it in non-SOEs. Variable LEV controls for gearing due to the 
resource constraint that debt impose on CSR expenditures (Barnea and Rubin, 2010).  
We also control for lagged financial performance (ROE). Our study of year-on-year CSR ratings 
extends assessment of financial performance effects on CSR in China (Li and Zhang, 2010; Li et al., 
2013, Rutledge et al., 2014; and Farag et al., 2015). As noted in Cheng et al. (2015), some earlier study 
findings are limited by a focus on a single year of CSR (i.e., 2008 SNAI) ratings.  
  Variable ID controls for independent non-executive directors’ (INEDs) moderation of CSR-
engagement. Ibrahim, Howard, and Angelidis (2003: 399) argue that INEDs are more philanthropic 
than insiders. International empirical evidence (Harjoto and Jo, 2011 and Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 
2015) also supports a positive link between INED presence and a firm’s level of socially-responsible 
investment. Inclusion of ID also helps assess the relative importance of shareowner and board 
influence on CSR ratings (Barrios et al., 2014). 
Equation 2 takes into account nonlinearities in ownership structure and board characteristics 
(namely, gender diversity and director independence). In Equation 2, we include squared terms for four 
of the independent variables in Equation 1. Specifically, for board gender diversity (FD), board 
independence (ID), Managerial Ownership and State Ownership. 
 
 
 
 
 
(Equation 2) 
 
In the above, FD2 is the squared term for FD of firm i in year t-1; ID2 is the squared term for ID of firm i in year 
t-1; Managerial Ownership2 is the squared term for Managerial Ownership of firm i in year t-1; and 
StateOwnership2 is the squared term for State Ownership of firm i in year t-1.  
 
Equations 1 and 2 also contain dummies to account for variation in CSR rating by exchange-
trading venue (Shanghai versus Shenzhen). We also control for variation arising from business sector 
(Guthrie and Roth, 1999; Burress and Zucca, 2004; Bell, 2005; and Melo and Garrido-Morgado, 2012), 
in terms of 15 dummies (for 16 industry sectors). From within the sub-sample of privately-controlled 
firms, female CEOs are most prominent in sectors for culture, water & environment and agriculture. 
For SOE firms, greater female CEO representation is evident in the hotel & catering, wholesale & 
retail, real estate and agriculture sectors. Appendix 1b reports bivariate correlations for all variables.21   
 
                                                          
21 In controlling for the effects of outliers, we adopt a natural log form for the variables for board size, management size, 
firm size and age. For ROE and LEV, we winsorize the top and bottom 1 percent of the respective distributions. 
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5. Empirical analysis 
5.1 Principal findings 
Table 3 reports regression results of Equation 1. The major variables of interest for gender 
leadership are FCEO and FChair. Both are significant in relation to CSR ratings, with FCEO especially 
so. Results thus offer strong support for hypothesis H1a. Importantly, significant female leadership 
effects remain robust after separate control for gender board diversity (FD). This observation suggests 
strong support for Hypothesis H2. Table 4 reaffirms this picture, where FD features without inclusion 
of female leadership variables and associated interaction terms. Results in Tables 3-4 thus point to the 
importance of female leadership and gender board balance in supporting CSR ratings.  
More broadly, findings in this area add to and extend related US-evidence on diversity effects 
(Harjoto et al., 2015, Hafsi and Turgut, 2013; Huang, 2013; Bear et al., 2010, and Rao and Tilt, 2016). It 
is also noteworthy that in Table 3 regressions, the p-values on estimated FD coefficients are at similar 
levels to those on FCEO. All in all, Tables 3 and 4 offer strong support for both hypotheses H1 and 
H2. Results thus indicate that the positive effect of female top-management participation on CSR-
engagement reflects both leadership and board diversity effects. This position is corroborated when we 
consider non-linear FD effects (see Table 5).22 In addition, estimated coefficients for FD and FD2 are 
both positive, supportive of a linear association between CSR ratings and female director presence.   
Results in Tables 3-5 indicate the absence of a significant positive foreign ownership effect (Qfiid 
and Overseas) on social ratings. Thus, little initial support is on offer for hypotheses H3a. Such results 
contrast with findings in other emerging markets, where the broader evidence points to foreign owners 
supporting social-engagement (Oh et al., 2011; and Soliman et al., 2012). Nonetheless, our results 
reaffirm findings on foreign-investor effects in developed market settings (Barnea and Rubin, 2010; 
and Dam and Scholtens, 2012). Findings in relation to our cross-listing dummy (Overseas) question 
whether the purported ‘bonding’, governance and disclosure (Coffee, 1999; Stulz, 1999; Oxelheim and 
Randoy, 2005; Karolyi, 2006 and Hope et al., 2013) effects of an offshore listing extend to areas like 
social-engagement. Our results for Qfiid, which in some regressions show significantly negative CSR 
rating effects, still accord in some sense with a political bridge-building notion of foreign investment 
(Du and Girma, 2010; Liu et al., 2014a; Lin et al., 2015; & Jiang and Kim, 2015). In this conception, 
CSR-engagement is not the top-priority for a QFII investing in a state- or politically-connected entity.   
In respect of hypothesis H4, Tables 3-5 highlight a negative relation between state ownership levels 
and CSR ratings. However, and as revealed in Table 5, non-linear effects are important. Specifically, 
when considering firms with large amounts of government holdings (see State Ownership2 in Table 5), 
the relation between state holdings and CSR-engagement turns positive. But as the relevant estimated 
coefficient is insignificant, the second premise of Hypothesis 4 receives only partial support. The first 
                                                          
22 We also check for on-linear effect in relation to other board characteristics. Perhaps not surprisingly, given the lack of 
significance of ID, a squared term for ID appears as an insignificant explanatory variable. We do not report regressions 
featuring this squared term.   
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premise of Hypothesis 4, which indicates a significantly negative relation between state ownership and 
social ratings, receives strong support in Table 5. Likewise, dummy SOE is significant and negatively-
signed in Table 3. We also consider non-linear effects in relation to FD in Table 5. 
The analysis reported in Table 6a reflects two subsample groups: one for SOE firms (n=1,297 
cases) and another for non-SOEs (n=1,115 cases). We define an SOE in accordance with Wang et al. 
(2008), where the largest shareowner is a government-owned entity holding more than 20% of the 
firm's stock. Interestingly, the female leadership dummy FCEO appears strongly significant across both 
issuer types. In contrast, foreign ownership dummies Qfiid and Overseas appear insignificantly 
different from zero in each of the SOE and non-SOE subgroup regressions. Nonetheless, the signs on 
the estimated coefficients on Qfiid are in accordance with Hypothesis H3b. But, overall, such results 
provide only limited support for H3b.  
We deepen analysis on this issue by considering a continuous variable, Foreign. This variable 
captures the proportion of a firm’s outstanding equity held by foreign investors, and includes all 
offshore H-shares, Qfiid holdings (held within the tradable A-share float), B-shares, as well as any non-
listed foreign legal-person shares outstanding. Results for this continuous variable run counter to 
Hypothesis 3b. In fact, positive and significant effects are noted with CSR ratings in the SOE 
subsample; with no effect apparent in the non-SOE sub-group. Table 6b sheds further light on the 
association between foreign investor influence and CSR ratings by considering two different sub-
samples: one where State Ownership is absent and the other where State Ownership is positive. Similar 
effects to those reported in Table 6a emerge in respect of variable Foreign. All in all, our analysis yields 
minimal support for Hypothesis 3b.           
In drilling deeper, Table 7a offers insight into state ownership interaction effects with the QFII 
dummy variable, Qfiid (see Table 7a). The relevant interactions are Qfiid*STDUM1, Qfiid*STDUM2 
and Qfiid*STDUM4. STDUM1 is a dummy with value 1 for firms with no state ownership. STDUM2 
(STDUM4) captures firms with state ownership between 0 and 10 (between 25 and 100) percent. Two 
issues underlie our choice of thresholds. First, in firms where state presence exists, ownership tends to 
be clustered between 10 and 25%. Second, given the dispersion of non-state holdings across legal-
person owners and other investors (principally domestic Chinese institutional investors holding 
tradable A-float), the state may exercise effective control at ownership levels as low as 25%. 
Shareholder dispersion allows for control well below 50% ownership.  China’s own Takeover Code 
(see King & Wood Mallesons, 2014) recognizes this point. It defines “control” when principal 
connected parties own 30% or more of a company’s voting rights. We adopt a slightly more 
conservative threshold of 25%, given (1) the recent contraction in average state ownership levels in 
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Chinese listed firms,23 and (2) the possibility that one or more legal person investors may be state-
“connected”. International evidence also informs our choice of threshold. Morck et al. (1988, page 
302) indicate US boards often exercise control with as little as 25% of a firm’s voting rights. Similarly, 
both Hong Kong and the UK, in their respective takeovers Codes, define control at 30 percent.24          
Results in Table 7a reveal a positive CSR rating effect when QFII investment arises in entities 
without state equity ownership. However, the CSR rating effect either inverts or becomes insignificant 
in relation to QFII investment in state-invested entities. Such results are consistent with QFIIs 
adopting a political bridge-building hypothesis when investing in state-owned entities (Du and Girma, 
2010). The corollary, as supported in table 7a, is that QFIIs are more inclined to support CSR-
engagement when the rationale for investment is non-political. 25  In Table 7b, we adopt slightly 
different thresholds of state ownership in relation to Qfiid interaction. Findings appear broadly similar 
to those in Table 7a for firms without state ownership. Mixed effects emerge at other thresholds.   
For our last remaining hypothesis, H5, the various results catalogued in Tables 3-7 reveal that 
Management Ownership has a positive association with CSR ratings. In many of these regressions, the 
effect is strongly significant. At first sight, such results contradict hypothesis, H5. However, Table 5 
demonstrates that non-linear effects underlie the overall association. In particular, results reveal 
significantly lower ratings in firms with entrenched insider, i.e., high Managerial Ownership.2 This 
outcome contrasts with the positive link evident at lower ownership levels. The reversal of the relation 
at higher managerial ownership levels supports H5 as well as contentions in Barnea and Rubin (2010).  
Tables 3-7 reveal minimal link between CSR activity and the proportion of a board’s independent 
board directors (ID). This finding contrasts with international evidence (Harjoto and Jo, 2011 and 
Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2015). The outcome likely reflects important institutional differences 
between China and developed Western-markets (Chang et al., 2015). Yu and Zheng (2014) argue that 
inadequate legal safeguards in China weaken the de facto independence of INEDs. Ownership may 
also mediate independent director effects. Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2015) observe that family-
control offsets the positive CSR disclosure effect of INEDs. Institutional ownership may also matter 
(see, for example, Johnson and Greening, 1999). But for Chinese firms’ CSR activities, the lack of 
significance of interaction term (ID*SOE) in Table 4 suggests the state does not directly limit INED 
influence. Moreover, INED influence has little bearing on CSR ratings for either SOEs or non-SOEs. 
In terms of other control effects, Tables 3-7 indicate strong positive associations between CSR 
ratings and a listing entity’s age as well as with various dimensions of firm size (Board Size, Managerial 
                                                          
23 Lam et al. (2013: 1137) report that the average state ownership level in mainland China listed companies declined from 
35.2 to 21.9% over the period 2000-8. This partly reflects new incoming share owners in state-invested companies, as well 
as an increase in the number of listings of non-state-invested firms.   
24 For the UK, see section C7 of The City Code (2016). For Hong Kong, see Def-8 of the Codes on Takeovers and 
Mergers and Share Repurchases (2010). 
25 We also examine interaction terms between qfiid and our measures of gender diversity and leadership. Results suggest 
weak interaction effects in relation to CSR scores. 
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Size and Firm Size). In contrast, and consistent with Barnea and Rubin (2010), CSR ratings display a 
significant inverse relation with corporate leverage (LEV). We also observe a negative relation between 
CSR ratings and lagged financial performance (ROE). Results in this last area add to Farag et al.’s 
(2015) recent evidence (in relation to the social and financial performance of SSE-180 Index 
constituents). Finally, results show that after control for effects like firm size and state ownership, the 
place of exchange-listing (dummy SHSE) has no significant bearing on CSR ratings.26 
 
5.2. Robustness and endogeneity checks 
 
Other than the strong support evident for hypothesis H5 (managerial ownership), the key take-way 
in our empirical set of results (Tables 3-7) is the resilience of the female leadership (FCEO) and board 
gender diversity (FD) variables. The strong positive associations evident across sub-sample and full-
sample regression provide compelling support for the respective hypothesis (H1 & H2). We add to 
such support by considering further analysis in relation to the important gender effects emanating from 
leadership (FCEO) and diversity (FD). 
First, in Appendix 2, we consider a narrower conception of female leadership by removing vice-
CEOs and vice-chairs from our definitions of FCEO and FChair. The resulting dummies, FCEO1 and 
FCHAIR1, have respective means of 0.09 and 0.04. Replacement of the broader-based FCEO measure 
by the narrower FCEO1 form results in some loss of significance for a female leadership effect (see 
Appendix 2). The same is not so in respect of FChair and FChair1. 
Second, and perhaps more important, endogeneity may be a concern in relation to the overall 
connection between gender and CSR ratings. Our earlier analysis partially accounts for this issue 
through its use of lagged variables. Analysis in Table 8 addresses this issue in a more formal manner by 
examining the time-series properties of female leadership appointments on social rating change 
(hypothesis H1b). Through such an “event-study” approach (Francoeur et al., 2014), we conveniently 
side-step any need to search for an elusive instrument for gender. 
∆CSRRt-1,t figures as the dependent variable in Table 8 regressions. It captures the percentage 
change in a firm’s CSR rating between year t-1 and year t (i.e. ∆CSRRt-1,t. = (CSRt-CSRt-1)/CSRt-1). Our 
principal focus is on dummy Appointment, assigned value one in cases where a firm introduces a new 
female top-management officer in year t-1. All other explanatory variables in Equation 1 are configured 
into change variable (i.e., ∆) form. So, for a given firm A, with female top-management appointment in 
                                                          
26 We also run separate regressions for Shanghai- (SHSE) and Shenzhen- (SZSE) listed firms. Cross-listings between the 
two exchanges are not permitted. For regressions of Shanghai-listings only, significantly stronger CSR ratings emerge for 
SOEs. The reverse applies for Shenzhen-listed firms. Variable FCEO remains positive and significant in both sets of 
regressions. Gender diversity variable FD only retains positive significance for SHSE listings. For hypothesis H4, CSR 
ratings are decreasing in SOE levels, but this effect is only significant for SZSE listings. For hypothesis H3a, cross-listings 
correlate with stronger (weaker) ratings for SHSE- (SZSE-) firms. No significant link exists between CSR ratings and qfiid 
on either exchange. For reasons of brevity, tables do not report the above results (but are available on request).  
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2011, we calculate the percentage change in its CSR rating between 2011 and 2012. Variable 
Appointment receives value one in such a case. To provide a meaningful benchmark for comparison, 
we consider CSR rating change for the same firm (A) for the year (i.e., 2009 to 2010) when no female 
appointment arose (i.e., 2009). Value zero thus applies to dummy Appointment for this firm-year case. 
This approach is preferable to a matching-pairs design, in which a different control firm is paired 
contemporaneously with target.27  Our approach thus compares CSR rating change in the same firm 
but over different periods.28  
Results in the first column of Table 8 reveal a significant positive relation between ∆CSRRt-1,t and 
Appointment. This evidence strongly supports hypothesis H1b and reinforces the cross-sectional 
evidence gathered in tables 3-7 in support of hypothesis H1a. In a further regression (Table 8, second 
column), we also consider the interaction between Appointment and a firm’s past return-on-equity 
change, ROE(t-2,t-1). This stage of analysis controls for a possible “glass cliff” effect (Ryan and 
Haslam, 2005). This effect asserts that appointment of a female leader is more likely in firms subject to 
challenging financial circumstances. Variable Appointment remains strongly significance even after 
controlling for such possibility. We therefore surmise that the positive female leadership effect on CSR 
ratings exists after control for a firm’s prior level of financial performance. 
In a further stage, we control for a possible self-selection bias using a Heckman (1976, 1979) two-
step procedure (see Table 9). By utilizing an additional independent variable (i.e., the Inverse Mills 
Ratio), the regression adjusts for endogeneity in relation to female leadership. Again, strong positive 
effects remain for both female leadership (FCEO) and board diversity (FD) effects in relation to CSR 
ratings.29 Results in Tables 8-9 therefore offer a further layer of support, to complement the already 
compelling body of evidence in Tables 3-7, of a resilient and marked female leadership and gender 
board balance effect on Chinese listed firms’ CSR ratings. 
 
6. Conclusions  
 
In terms of Rankins’ CSR ratings for five consecutive years, 2009 to 2013, the present investigation 
reveals that board officer gender exerts appreciable influence on corporate social-engagement. A major 
contribution of this study is the distinction drawn between female leadership and gender board 
                                                          
27 Suppose a female leader is appointed in firm B in 2009. Firm B’s CSR rating change is thus calculated between 2009 
and 2010 (Appointment=1). The absence of RKS CSR ratings prior to 2009 means that the control observation is B’s CSR 
rating change between 2010 and 2011, reflecting a year (2010) when no female appointment occurs in B (Appointment =0). 
28 Appointment=1 cases slightly outnumber Appointment=0 cases. This situation is due to a small number of firms with 
only two years of CSR rating data. For such firms, it is impossible to find a controlled observation (Appointment=0). There 
are 110 top-level female appointments (to female CEO/vice-CEO or female chair/vice-chair positions) during the 2009 
to2013 period. The total number of observations available in Table 8 is 213. This reflects the 110 Appointment=1 cases 
plus 103 observations for CSR rating change when no female leadership appointment arose (Appointment=0). 
29 Another approach is to adjust for endogeneity by adopting a 2SLS estimation design with instrumental variable (see Jia 
and Zhang, 2012, in relation to female board member participation). Given difficulties in finding an appropriate instrument, 
we focus on the Heckman (1976, 1979) approach as a preferred alternative.  
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diversity. The prevailing focus heretofore has been on diversity issues. This focus on gender diversity is 
implicit to accounts emphasizing social networks (Westphal and Milton, 2000), Critical Mass Theory 
(Kramer et al., 2006; Bear et al., 2010; and Soares et al., 2011) and team dynamics (Woolley et al., 2010; 
and Hoogendoorn et al., 2013). The spin-off benefits arising from diversity include enhanced 
monitoring, more incisive decision-making and greater transparency.  
In this article we show that in relation to social ratings, leadership effects are just as important, if 
not more so, than effects arising from gender board balance. Cross-sectional and time-series results 
reveal that female-leadership strongly supports corporate social performance. This is an important 
finding, especially in light of women’s increasing access to corporate leadership positions in China 
(Lam et al., 2013). It also extends US evidence on gender diversity and CSR-engagement (Bear et al., 
2010; Hafsi and Turgut, 2013; Huang, 2013; and Harjoto et al., 2015) to the specific consideration of 
leadership effects and to an important and very different market context.   
The present study’s second major contribution is its assessment of the impact of foreign ownership 
on social ratings. Foreign investor influence, as with female participation in top-management in China, 
has risen significantly in recent years. In general terms, there is a significant positive association 
between CSR rating and foreign equity ownership levels. We also examine foreign investor influence 
more specifically by scrutinizing (1) qualified foreign institutional investor (QFII) presence in Chinese 
A-shareholdings and (2) offshore cross-listings. Associations between the two foreign investor 
dummies and social performance appear weak for the whole sample. 
In relation to QFIIs, we consider a political bridge-building conception for their investment 
holdings (Du and Girma, 2010; Liu et al., 2014a; Lin et al., 2015; and Jiang and Kim, 2015). In this 
account, foreign parties’ prime motivation for investment in state-controlled firms is to procure 
regulatory and business advantage with government agencies. In non-SOEs, where state presence is 
less conspicuous, the target’s firm-specific attributes possibly take-on greater importance. In such a 
context, foreign parties are likely to focus more on a target firm’s social and financial attributes. In 
SOEs, such concerns may be subordinate to the labyrinth of political benefits on offer from affiliation 
with state-controllers. Our results, in respect of both foreign investor measures, i.e., QFII presence and 
offshore cross-listing status, offer only limited support for such an account.   
We also examine firms’ broader ownership characteristics in relation to their CSR ratings. First, 
state ownership displays a non-linear association with ratings; with negative associations at lower state 
equity levels being displaced by positive effects at higher ownership levels. In terms of managerial 
ownership, we observe a positive relation in general terms. However, and as suggested in Barnea and 
Rubin (2010), CSR ratings invert at high managerial ownership levels. Barnea and Rubin (2010) argue 
that managers use firm-level CSR expenditure to build social standing. However, the incentive to do so 
wanes as insider stakes rise, due to the drag-effect of increased CSR expenditure on share valuations. 
Empirical findings elsewhere resound to a negative managerial ownership-CSR rating link (Barnea and 
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Rubin, 2010; Oh et al., 2011; and Soliman et al., 2012). Such an outcome is also more likely in firms 
subject to greater agency cost (Prior et al., 2008; Martinez-Ferrero and Garcia-Sanchez, 2015).      
The present article also considers other important governance characteristics, including 
independent director participation and board duality. However, clear connection with CSR 
performance proved elusive. These findings contrast with related evidence for the US and Europe 
(Harjoto and Jo, 2011; and Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2015). The contrast likely reflects institutional 
differences. Above all, Yu and Zheng (2014) argue that weak legal safeguards in China facilitate easy 
“removal” of independent board officers by politically-connected executive officers. Their evidence 
shows that, despite major market reforms, internal governance mechanisms still function sub-
optimally. Our evidence is congruent with such a view. More specifically, China’s current institutional 
and legal environment affords independent directors a relatively weak voice in the promotion of 
corporate social-engagement. 
Finally, CSR ratings exhibit significant positive association with a firm’s total assets, age and size; 
but a negative one with leverage. We also identify an inverse association between social ratings and 
lagged financial performance. This last finding reaffirms and extends earlier evidence (Rutledge et al., 
2014; and Farag et al., 2015) on the financial-social performance nexus in China. 
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Table 1a 
Variable definitions  
 
CSR A firm’s Corporate Social Responsibility reporting rating score 
CSRD Dummy variable for firms with CSR reporting 
FCEO Dummy =1 where a firm’s CEO and/or vice CEO is female (=0 otherwise) 
FChair Dummy =1 where a board’s Chair and/or vice Chair is female (=0 otherwise) 
Duality Dummy =1 where CEO and board chair are the same person (=0 otherwise) 
FD Percentage of female directors 
ID Percentage of independent directors 
Board Size Board size measured as natural logarithm of total number of directors (ND) 
Managerial Size Managerial size measured as the natural logarithm of the total number of executive 
managers (NM) 
Managerial 
Ownership 
Percentage of outstanding shares in managerial ownership 
State Ownership Percentage of state ownership 
SOE Dummy variable for state-owned enterprises (1 for SOEs and 0 for Non-SOEs) 
H10 Herfindahl index for ownership by top-10 shareholders 
Qfiid Dummy variable for firms with Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFIIs) 
Overseas Dummy variable for overseas listing 
AGE Listing age of firm 
LEV Leverage ratio (= total debts scaled by total assets) 
ROE Return on equity 
Firm Size Firm size measured as the natural logarithm of total assets (TA) 
SHSE Dummy variable for firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) 
 
Table 1b         
Descriptive statistics  
 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Min Max 
CSRt 2412 35.46 32.00 13.05 11.69 84.02 
CSRDt 8102 0.30 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 
FCEOt-1 8102 0.32 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 
FChairt-1 8102 0.09 0.00 0.28 0.00 1.00 
FDt-1 8102 11.23 11.00 10.99 0.00 71.00 
IDt-1  8102 35.61 33.00 6.59 0.00 80.00 
Dualityt-1 8102 0.33 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Board Size(ND)t-1 8102 10.05 9.00 2.59 4.00 26.00 
Managerial Size(NM)t-1 8102 6.82 6.00 3.28 1.00 45.00 
Managerial Ownershipt-1 8102 3.54 0.00 13.30 0.00 100.00 
State Ownershipt-1 8102 20.44 6.40 23.91 0.00 100.00 
SOEt-1 8102 0.43 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
H10t-1  8102 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.80 
Qfiidt-1 8102 0.09 0.00 0.28 0.00 1.00 
ROEt-1 8102 0.09 0.09 0.77 -11.27 33.83 
Aget 8102 11.35 12.00 4.97 1.00 23.00 
LEVt 8102 0.52 0.52 0.22 0.00 1.00 
Firm Size(TA)t 8102 49,452.66 2,714.46 576,727.5 .05 17,500,000 
SHSEt 8102 0.53 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
OVERSEASt 8102 0.04 0.00 0.20 0.00 1.00 
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Table 2a 
Sample selection 
 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2009-13 
Initial observations 314 471 492 580 644 2,501 
No. of observations with missing data  9 22 32 17 9 89 
Final observations 305 449 460 563 635 2,412 
 
Table 2b  
Descriptive statistics for CSR reporting and non-reporting firms (CSRD=1 indicates CSR disclosure; CSRD=0 indicates non-disclosure)  
 
CSRD is a dummy variable for firms with CSR reporting; FCEO is a dummy variable that equals 1 where a firm’s CEO and/or vice CEO is female and 0 otherwise; FCEO is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 where a board’s Chair and/or vice Chair is female and 0 otherwise; FD is the percentage of female directors; ID is the percentage of independent directors; Duality is a dummy variable for 
firms with duality of CEO and board chair (1=if CEO and Chair are the same person; 0 if not); Board Size (ND) is the total number of board directors. Management Size (NM) is the total number of 
executive managers; Managerial Ownership is the percentage of managerial ownership; State Ownership is the percentage of state ownership; SOE is a dummy variable for SOEs (1 for SOEs and 0 for 
Non-SOEs);  H10 is the Herfindahl Index for ownership by top-10 shareholders; Qfiid is a dummy variable for firms receiving QFII investment; ROE is the return on equity; AGE is a firm’s listing 
age; LEV is the leverage ratio; Firm Size (TA) is a firm’s total assets; SHSE is a dummy for firms with Shanghai Stock Exchange listing; and OVERSEAS is a dummy for overseas listing. 
 
 CSRD=1 CSRD=0 t test for diff.  
in means Variable Obs   Mean Median Std. Min Max Obs  Mean Median Std. Min Max 
FCEOt-1 2412 0.31 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 5690 0.33 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 -1.44 
FChairt-1 2412 0.06 0.00 0.24 0.00 1.00 5690 0.10 0.00 0.30 0.00 1.00 -5.87*** 
FDt-1 2412 9.55 9.00 10.24 0.00 56.00 5690 11.94 11.00 11.22 0.00 71.00 -9.00*** 
IDt-1 2412 36.08 33.00 6.87 8.00 75.00 5690 35.42 33.00 6.45 0.00 80.00 4.14*** 
Dualityt-1 2412 0.31 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 5690 0.34 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 -2.67*** 
Board Size (ND)t-1 2412 10.63 10.00 2.85 5.00 26.00 5690 9.80 9.00 2.44 4.00 25.00 13.22*** 
Managerial Size (NM)t-1 2412 8.14 7.00 3.82 2.00 28.00 5690 6.27 6.00 2.84 1.00 45.00 24.42*** 
Managerial Ownershipt-1 2412 1.98 0.00 9.05 0.00 100.00 5690 4.20 0.00 14.69 0.00 100 -6.86*** 
State Ownershipt-1 2412 26.76 25.99 25.98 0.00 100.00 5690 17.76 2.19 22.45 0.00 100 15.71*** 
SOEt-1 2412 0.54 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 5690 0.38 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 11.40*** 
H10t-1  2412 0.20 0.17 0.14 0.00 0.80 5690 0.16 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.75 13.79*** 
Qfiidt-1 2412 0.13 0.00 0.33 0.00 1.00 5690 0.07 0.00 0.26 0.00 1.00 8.34*** 
ROEt-1 2412 0.13 0.12 0.14 -1.16 3.58 5690 0.07 0.07 0.91 -11.27 33.83 3.39*** 
Aget 2412 10.69 11.00 5.09 1.00 23.00 5690 11.63 12.00 4.89 1.00 23.00 -7.76*** 
LEVt 2412 0.52 0.53 0.21 0.01 1.00 5690 0.52 0.52 0.22 0.00 1.00 -0.08 
Firm Size (Rmb Millions,TA)t 2412 154,722.9 7,343.49 1,048,806 85.66 17,500,000 5690 4,828.4 1,988.98 27,706.88 0.05 1,820,000 10.77*** 
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SHSEt 2412 0.62 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 5690 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 9.75*** 
OVERSEASt 2412 0.11 0.00 0.32 0.00 1.00 5690 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.00 1.00 22.52*** 
Note: *, **, and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% for t test. 
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Table 3 
CSR rating and its association with female board representation, leadership and foreign ownership 
 
 
CSR is a firm’s Corporate Social Responsibility reporting rating score. 
 
FCEO is a dummy variable for female CEO or vice-CEO (1=female CEO or vice-CEO; and 0 if both are male); 
FChair is a dummy variable for female Chair or vice-Chair (1=female Chair or vice-Chair; and 0 if both are 
male); Duality is a dummy (1= if CEO and Chair are the same person; and 0 if not); FD is the percentage of 
female directors; ID is the percentage of independent directors; Board Size is measured as the natural logarithm 
of total number of directors; Managerial Size is  measured as the natural logarithm of total number of executive 
managers; Managerial Ownership is the percentage of managerial ownership; State Ownership is the percentage 
of state ownership; SOE is a dummy variable (= 1 for an SOE and 0 for a Non-SOE); H10 is the Herfindahl 
index for ownership by top-10 shareholders; Qfiid is a dummy variable for firms with QFII investment; ROE is 
return on equity; AGE is the natural logarithm of a firm’s listing age; LEV is leverage ratio; Firm Size is firm size 
measured as the natural logarithm of total assets; SHSE is a dummy for Shanghai Stock Exchange listing; and 
Overseas is a dummy for offshore H-share listing. 
 
Panel Regressions  
 
CSR Rating Score 
 
 Coef. z test Coef. z test 
Constant -93.04*** -13.27 -93.35*** -13.29 
FCEOt-1 1.11** 2.37 1.62*** 2.64 
FCEOt-1×FDt-1   -0.05 -1.26 
FChairt-1 1.83* 1.83 3.09* 1.65 
FChairt-1×FDt-1   -0.06 -0.77 
FDt-1 0.05** 2.13 0.08*** 2.61 
IDt-1 0.04 1.55 0.04 1.51 
Dualityt-1 -0.39 -0.87 -0.37 -0.83 
Board Sizet-1 1.76* 1.94 1.69* 1.86 
Managerial Sizet-1 3.63*** 5.80 3.65*** 5.83 
Managerial Ownershipt-1 0.03 0.88 0.03 0.88 
SOEt-1 -1.59*** -2.80 -1.58*** -2.79 
H10t-1 -2.90 -1.20 -2.86 -1.19 
Qfiidt-1 -0.75* -1.70 -0.76* -1.71 
ROEt-1 -2.81*** -2.63 -2.84*** -2.66 
AGEt 3.58*** 6.24 3.60*** 6.27 
LEVt -6.57*** -4.08 -6.57*** -4.08 
Firm Sizet 4.92*** 17.01 4.93*** 17.03 
SHSEt -1.75** -2.03 -1.79** -2.08 
Overseast -0.32 -0.27 -0.35 -0.30 
Industries Controlled Controlled 
   
Number of obs  2412 2412 
Number of groups  682 682 
Wald Chi2 832.13*** 834.67*** 
R2 within 24.61% 24.77% 
R2 between 31.48% 31.48% 
R2 overall 35.70% 35.68% 
 
Note:  *, **, and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% for z and Chi tests, respectively. 
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Table 4 
Gender board diversity (FD), foreign ownership (Qfiid & Overseas) and firms’ CSR ratings 
 
 
CSR is a firm’s Corporate Social Responsibility reporting rating score. 
 
FD is the percentage of female directors; ID is the percentage of independent directors; Duality is a dummy 
variable (1=if CEO and Chair are the same person; and 0 if not); Board Size measured as the natural logarithm 
of total number of directors; Managerial Size measured as the natural logarithm of total number of executive 
managers; Managerial Ownership is the percentage of managerial ownership; State Ownership is the percentage 
of state ownership; SOE is a dummy variable (=1 for an SOE; and 0 for a Non-SOE);  H10 is the Herfindahl 
index for ownership by top-10 Shareholders; Qfiid is a dummy variable for firms with QFII investment; ROE is 
return on equity; AGE is the natural logarithm of a firm’s listing age; LEV is leverage ratio; Firm Size is 
measured as the natural logarithm of total assets; SHSE is a dummy variable for firms listed on Shanghai Stock 
Exchange; and Overseas is a dummy for offshore H-share listing. 
  
Panel Regressions  CSR Rating Score 
 Coef. z test Coef. z test 
Constant -95.16*** -13.40 -93.86*** -13.20 
FDt-1 0.07*** 2.84 0.07*** 2.87 
IDt-1 0.05 1.44 0.04 1.03 
Dualityt-1 -0.36 -0.80 -0.31 -0.69 
Board Sizet-1 1.79** 1.99 1.73** 1.92 
Managerial Sizet-1 3.86*** 6.26 3.85*** 6.23 
Managerial Ownershipt-1 0.02 0.78 0.03 0.82 
State Ownershipt-1 -0.04 -1.03   
IDt-1×State Ownershipt-1 0.00 -0.35   
SOEt-1   -1.95 -1.10 
IDt-1×SOEt-1   0.01 0.20 
H10t-1 -0.80 -0.32 -2.83 -1.17 
Qfiidt-1 -0.75* -1.69 -0.73* -1.63 
ROEt-1 -2.81*** -2.63 -2.80*** -2.62 
AGEt 3.54*** 6.15 3.67*** 6.38 
LEVt -6.48*** -4.02 -6.60*** -4.09 
Firm Sizet 4.96*** 17.13 4.93*** 17.00 
SHSEt -1.51* -1.75 -1.82** -2.11 
Overseast -0.48 -0.41 -0.30 -0.25 
Industries Controlled Controlled 
   
Number of obs  2412 2412 
Number of groups  682 682 
Wald Chi2 829.51*** 819.54*** 
R2 within 24.70% 24.57% 
R2 between 31.18% 31.02% 
R2 overall 35.48%  35.27%  
 
Note:  *, **, and *** represent respective significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% for z and Chi tests, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Nonlinearity in board diversity and ownership 
 
 
CSR is a firm’s Corporate Social Responsibility reporting rating score. 
 
FCEO is a dummy variable for female CEO or vice-CEO (1=female CEO or vice-CEO; and 0 if both are male); 
FChair is a dummy variable for female Chair or vice-Chair (1=female Chair or vice-Chair; and 0 if both are 
male); Duality is a dummy variable (= 1 if CEO and Chair are the same person; and 0 if not); FD is the 
percentage of female directors; ID is the percentage of independent directors; Board Size measured as the 
natural logarithm of total number of directors; Managerial Size measured as the natural logarithm of total 
number of executive managers; Managerial Ownership is the percentage of managerial ownership; State 
Ownership is the percentage of state ownership; SOE is a dummy variable (=1 for an SOE; and 0 for a Non-
SOE);  H10 is the Herfindahl index for ownership by top-10 Shareholders; Qfiid is a dummy variable for firms 
with QFII investment; ROE is return on equity; AGE is the natural logarithm of a firm’s listing age; LEV is 
leverage ratio; Firm Size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets; SHSE is a dummy variable for firms 
listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange; and Overseas is a dummy for offshore H-share listing. 
 
Panel Regressions  CSR Rating Score 
 
Coef. z test Coef. z test 
Constant -93.51*** -13.34 -93.15*** -13.28 
FCEOt 1.11** 2.36 1.12** 2.38 
FChairt 1.82* 1.83 1.83* 1.83 
FDt-1 0.10** 1.95 0.10* 2.01 
FDt-12 0.00 -1.08 0.00 -1.11 
IDt-1 0.04* 1.64 0.04* 1.65 
Dualityt-1 -0.44 -0.98 -0.40 -0.88 
Board Sizet-1 1.77** 1.95 1.69* 1.87 
Managerial Sizet-1 3.70*** 5.91 3.71*** 5.91 
Managerial Ownershipt-1 0.14* 1.92 0.15** 2.00 
Managerial Ownershipt-12 -0.00* -1.76 -0.00* -1.80 
State Ownershipt-1 -0.07*** -2.65   
State Ownershipt-12 0.00 1.10   
SOEt-1   -1.55*** -2.74 
H10t-1 -1.03 -0.40 -2.45 -1.01 
Qfiidt-1 -0.73* -1.63 -0.72* -1.63 
ROEt-1 -2.82*** -2.65 -2.84*** -2.66 
Aget 3.59*** 6.23 3.66*** 6.36 
LEVt -6.42*** -3.99 -6.51*** -4.04 
Firm Sizet 4.91*** 16.96 4.89*** 16.89 
SHSEt -1.30 -1.50 -1.68** -1.95 
Overseast -0.37 -0.31 -0.29 -0.25 
Industries Controlled Controlled 
   
Number of obs  2412 2412 
Number of groups  682 682 
Wald Chi2 847.87*** 837.05*** 
R2 within 24.99% 24.75% 
R2 between 31.59% 31.51% 
R2 overall 35.90% 35.80% 
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Notes:  *, **, and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% for z and Chi tests, respectively.  
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Table 6a  
SOEs versus non-SOEs 
 
CSR is a firm’s Corporate Social Responsibility reporting rating score; and SOE is a dummy variable (=1 for an SOE; and 0 for a Non-SOE).  
FCEO is a dummy variable for female CEO or vice-CEO (1=female CEO or vice-CEO; and 0 if both are male); FChair is a dummy variable for female Chair or vice-Chair (1=female Chair or vice-Chair; and 0 if both are male); 
Duality is a dummy variable (= 1 if CEO and Chair are the same person; and 0 if not); FD is the percentage of female directors; ID is the percentage of independent directors; Board Size measured as the natural logarithm of total 
number of directors; Managerial Size measured as the natural logarithm of total number of executive managers; Managerial Ownership is the percentage of managerial ownership; H10 is the Herfindahl index for ownership by top-10 
Shareholders; Foreign is the percentage of ownership hold by foreign shareholders including QFIIs, B shares, H shares and foreign legal person shares; Qfiid is a dummy variable for firms with QFII investment; ROE is return on 
equity; AGE is the natural logarithm of a firm’s listing age; LEV is leverage ratio; Firm Size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets; SHSE is a dummy variable for firms listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange; and Overseas is 
a dummy for offshore H-share listing. 
 
Simultaneous OLS Regressions SOEs Non-SOEs 
Chi test for diff. in Coef. 
SOEs Non-SOEs 
Chi test for diff. in Coef. 
  Coef. t test Coef. t test Coef. t test Coef. t test 
           
Constant -89.87*** -12.03 -55.49*** -7.94 11.77*** -88.51*** -11.97 -56.38*** -8.10 10.29*** 
FCEOt 2.51*** 3.30 3.00*** 4.82 0.24 2.46*** 3.30 3.05*** 4.91 0.36 
FChairt 0.50 0.30 -0.05 -0.05 0.07 0.40 0.24 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 
FDt-1 0.12*** 3.34 0.03 0.96 4.12** 0.12*** 3.31 0.02 0.87 4.15** 
IDt-1 -0.00 -0.07 0.05 1.18 0.81 0.01 0.17 0.05 1.16 0.51 
Dualityt-1 -0.73 -1.02 -0.64 -1.08 0.01 -0.61 -0.86 -0.66 -1.12 0.00 
Board Sizet-1 5.19*** 3.48 0.49 0.36 5.09** 4.74*** 3.19 0.38 0.28 4.31** 
Managerial Sizet-1 1.83** 2.18 3.74*** 5.02 2.84* 1.78** 2.15 3.74*** 5.02 3.02* 
Managerial Ownershipt-1 0.71 0.83 0.16*** 2.72 0.86 0.67 0.78 0.15*** 2.64 0.75 
Managerial Ownershipt-12 -0.04 -0.89 -0.00* -1.64 1.38 -0.04 -0.87 0.00 -1.54 1.30 
H10t-1 2.43 0.90 4.06* 1.71 0.19 2.10 0.78 4.03* 1.69 0.27 
Qfiidt-1 -0.97 -1.09 0.92 1.03 1.80      
Foreign      0.17*** 4.63 -0.01 -0.29 12.90*** 
ROEt-1 1.12 0.57 -6.38*** -2.54 5.46** 1.42 0.72 -6.36** -2.52 5.79** 
AGEt 0.68 0.94 -1.61*** -2.59 4.80** 0.31 0.43 -1.60** -2.58 3.45* 
LEVt -3.65* -1.76 -10.24*** -5.46 6.30** -4.17** -2.03 -10.45*** -5.58 5.65** 
Firm Sizet 4.23*** 14.87 4.40*** 13.39 0.14 4.25*** 15.18 4.46*** 13.70 0.18 
SHSEt 1.02 1.16 -2.08*** -3.41 9.22*** 1.20 1.37 -2.05*** -3.37 10.29*** 
Overseast 0.87 0.94 2.33 1.20 0.18 -3.77** -2.76 2.33 1.16 2.72* 
Industries Controlled Controlled 
 
Controlled Controlled 
 
  
 
  
  
  
 
Number of obs  1297 1115 2412 1297 1115 2412 
F test  32.39*** 19.71***   33.54*** 19.66***   
Adjusted R2 43.66% 34.24%   44.55% 34.18%   
Note: *, **, and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% for t, F and Chi tests, respectively. 
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Table 6b  
Firms with state ownership (State Ownership>0) versus firms without state ownership (State Ownership=0) 
 
CSR is a firm’s Corporate Social Responsibility reporting rating score; and State Ownership is the percentage of state ownership. 
FCEO is a dummy variable for female CEO or vice-CEO (1=female CEO or vice-CEO; and 0 if both are male); FChair is a dummy variable for female Chair or vice-Chair (1=female Chair or vice-Chair; and 0 
if both are male); Duality is a dummy variable (= 1 if CEO and Chair are the same person; and 0 if not); FD is the percentage of female directors; ID is the percentage of independent directors; Board Size 
measured as the natural logarithm of total number of directors; Managerial Size measured as the natural logarithm of total number of executive managers; Managerial Ownership is the percentage of managerial 
ownership; H10 is the Herfindahl index for ownership by top-10 Shareholders; Foreign is the percentage of ownership hold by foreign shareholders including QFIIs, B shares, H shares and foreign legal person 
shares; Qfiid is a dummy variable for firms with QFII investment; ROE is return on equity; AGE is the natural logarithm of a firm’s listing age; LEV is leverage ratio; Firm Size is measured as the natural 
logarithm of total assets; SHSE is a dummy variable for firms listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange; and Overseas is a dummy for offshore H-share listing. 
 
Simultaneous OLS Regressions State Ownership>0 State Ownership=0 Chi test for diff. 
in Coefficients 
State Ownership>0 State Ownership=0 Chi test for diff. 
in Coefficients 
 Coef. t test Coef. t test Coef. t test Coef. t test 
Constant -82.15*** -12.42 -56.61*** -7.04 5.61** -77.67*** -12.02 -58.74*** -7.65 3.18* 
FCEOt 2.79*** 4.23 2.85*** 3.98 0.00 2.63*** 4.04 2.95*** 4.18 0.11 
FChairt -0.29 -0.21 0.79 0.66 0.37 -0.28 -0.20 0.83 0.70 0.39 
FDt-1 0.10*** 3.25 0.01 0.39 4.46** 0.10*** 3.23 0.01 0.23 4.86** 
IDt-1 -0.01 -0.31 0.08* 1.66 2.36 -0.02 -0.37 0.08* 1.68 2.52 
Dualityt-1 -0.39 -0.62 -0.72 -1.09 0.13 -0.40 -0.64 -0.72 -1.09 0.12 
Board Sizet-1 4.27*** 3.27 0.30 0.19 3.44* 3.96*** 3.04 0.11 0.07 3.13* 
Managerial Sizet-1 1.99*** 2.65 4.55*** 5.45 4.93** 2.08*** 2.79 4.52*** 5.42 4.47** 
Managerial Ownershipt-1 -0.10 -0.55 0.20*** 3.17 5.05** -0.10 -0.54 0.19*** 3.10 4.70** 
Managerial Ownershipt-12 0.00 0.72 0.00* -1.95 4.68** 0.00 0.70 -0.00* -1.86 4.12** 
H10t-1 2.54 1.10 3.86 1.42 0.12 2.22 0.96 3.74 1.38 0.16 
Qfiidt-1 -0.92 -1.15 1.45 1.38 2.34      
Foreignt-1      0.08*** 3.66 0.00 0.08 3.89** 
ROEt-1 0.68 0.37 -6.87** -2.30 4.10** 0.89 0.49 -7.04** -2.36 4.66** 
AGEt -0.33 -0.51 -0.40 -0.57 0.01 -0.38 -0.60 -0.40 -0.56 0.00 
LEVt -5.02*** -2.70 -10.70*** -5.03 4.65** -4.87*** -2.65 -10.89*** -5.11 5.18** 
Firm Sizet 4.25*** 16.64 4.22*** 11.02 0.00 4.10*** 16.90 4.35*** 11.85 0.24 
SHSEt 0.39 0.55 -2.21*** -3.15 7.06*** 0.36 0.51 -2.20*** -3.12 6.78*** 
Overseas 0.92 1.04 1.38 0.58 0.01      
Industries Controlled Controlled  Controlled Controlled  
       
Number of obs  1540 872 2412 1540 872 2412 
F test  38.31*** 12.97***  40.22*** 13.32***  
Adjusted R2 43.69% 29.88%  44.13% 29.78%  
Note: *, **, and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% for t, F and Chi tests, respectively. 
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Table7a  
Interaction between foreign ownership and state ownership 
 
 
CSR is a firm’s Corporate Social Responsibility reporting rating score. 
 
STDUM1 (=1 if STATE =0%; zero otherwise). 
STDUM2 (=1 if 0% < STATE < 10%; zero otherwise). 
STDUM3 (=1 if 10% ≤ STATE < 25%; zero otherwise). 
STDUM4 (=1 if 25% ≤ STATE; zero otherwise). 
 
FCEO is a dummy variable for female CEO or vice-CEO (1=female CEO or vice-CEO; and 0 if both are male); 
FChair is a dummy variable for female Chair or vice-Chair (1=female Chair or vice-Chair; and 0 if both are 
male); Duality is a dummy variable (= 1 if CEO and Chair are the same person; and 0 if not); FD is the 
percentage of female directors; ID is the percentage of independent directors; Board Size measured as the 
natural logarithm of total number of directors; Managerial Size measured as the natural logarithm of total 
number of executive managers; Managerial Ownership is the percentage of managerial ownership; State 
Ownership is the percentage of state ownership; SOE is a dummy variable (=1 for an SOE; and 0 for a Non-
SOE);  H10 is the Herfindahl index for ownership by top-10 Shareholders; Qfiid is a dummy variable for firms 
with QFII investment; ROE is return on equity; AGE is the natural logarithm of a firm’s listing age; LEV is 
leverage ratio; Firm Size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets; SHSE is a dummy variable for firms 
listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange; and Overseas is a dummy for offshore H-share listing. 
 
Panel regressions results containing QFII*STDUM1, QFII*STDUM2 and QFII*STDUM4 
 
Panel Regressions  CSR rating score 
 Coef. z test Coef. z test 
Constant -93.90*** -13.41 -93.87*** -13.41 
FCEOt 1.07** 2.27 1.06** 2.26 
FChairt 1.86* 1.86 1.86* 1.86 
FDt-1 0.05** 2.23 0.05** 2.22 
IDt-1 0.04 1.46 0.04 1.44 
Dualityt-1 -0.43 -0.96 -0.45 -1.00 
Board Sizet-1 1.77** 1.96 1.77** 1.97 
Managerial Sizet-1 3.67*** 5.88 3.67*** 5.87 
Managerial Ownershipt-1 0.02 0.78 0.03 0.79 
State Ownershipt-1 -0.04*** -3.75 -0.04*** -3.69 
H10t-1 -1.27 -0.51 -1.27 -0.51 
Qfiidt-1 -2.71* -1.73 Dropped  
Qfiidt-1×STDUM1 3.14* 1.84 0.51 0.66 
Qfiidt-1×STDUM2 -1.37 -0.63 -3.97** -2.52 
Qfiidt-1×STDUM4 1.85 1.13 -0.80 -1.37 
ROEt-1 -2.82*** -2.65 -2.78*** -2.61 
AGEt 3.52*** 6.12 3.52*** 6.12 
LEVt -6.45*** -4.01 -6.53*** -4.06 
Firm Sizet 4.96*** 17.16 4.96*** 17.16 
SHSEt -1.45* -1.69 -1.46* -1.71 
Overseast -0.45 -0.38 -0.44 -0.38 
Industries Controlled Controlled 
   
Number of obs  2412 2412 
Number of groups  682 682 
Wald Chi2 852.10*** 848.63*** 
R2 within 25.18% 25.02% 
R2 between 31.54% 31.61% 
R2 overall 35.89% 35.99% 
 
Note: *, **, and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% for z and Chi tests, respectively.   
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Table7 b 
Interaction between foreign ownership and state ownership 
 
CSR is a firm’s Corporate Social Responsibility reporting rating score; and SOE is a dummy variable (=1 for an 
SOE; and 0 for a Non-SOE). 
 
STDUM1 (=1 if STATE =0%; zero otherwise). 
ST5 (=1 if 0% < STATE ≤5%; zero otherwise). 
ST10 (=1 if 5% < STATE ≤10%; zero otherwise). 
ST30 (=1 if 10% < STATE ≤30%; zero otherwise). 
ST100 (=1 if 30% < STATE; zero otherwise). 
 
FCEO is a dummy variable for female CEO or vice-CEO (1=female CEO or vice-CEO; and 0 if both are male); 
FChair is a dummy variable for female Chair or vice-Chair (1=female Chair or vice-Chair; and 0 if both are 
male); Duality is a dummy variable (= 1 if CEO and Chair are the same person; and 0 if not); FD is the 
percentage of female directors; ID is the percentage of independent directors; Board Size measured as the 
natural logarithm of total number of directors; Managerial Size measured as the natural logarithm of total 
number of executive managers; Managerial Ownership is the percentage of managerial ownership; State 
Ownership is the percentage of state ownership; H10 is the Herfindahl index for ownership by top-10 
Shareholders; Qfiid is a dummy variable for firms with QFII investment; ROE is return on equity; AGE is the 
natural logarithm of a firm’s listing age; LEV is leverage ratio; Firm Size is measured as the natural logarithm of 
total assets; SHSE is a dummy variable for firms listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange; and Overseas is a dummy 
for offshore H-share listing. 
 
Panel Regressions CSR rating score 
 Coef. z test Coef. z test 
Constant -93.87*** -13.40 -93.66*** -13.37 
FCEOt 1.05** 2.24 1.08** 2.31 
FChairt 1.88* 1.88 1.78* 1.78 
FDt-1 0.05** 2.25 0.05** 2.17 
IDt-1 0.04 1.48 0.04 1.54 
Dualityt-1 -0.42 -0.95 -0.43 -0.95 
Board Sizet-1 1.78** 1.97 1.81** 2.00 
Managerial Sizet-1 3.67*** 5.89 3.67*** 5.87 
Managerial Ownershipt-1 0.02 0.78 0.02 0.77 
State Ownershipt-1 -0.05*** -3.79 -0.05*** -3.76 
H10t-1 -1.26 -0.51 -1.11 -0.45 
Qfiidt-1 -5.62*** -2.66 Dropped  
Qfiidt-1×STDUM1 6.02*** 2.74 0.54 0.70 
Qfiidt-1×ST10 3.46 1.09 -2.16 -0.91 
Qfiidt-1×ST30 2.96 1.20 -2.65** -2.10 
Qfiidt-1×ST100 4.91** 2.23 -0.71 -1.19 
ROEt-1 -2.76*** -2.60 -2.83*** -2.65 
AGEt 3.52*** 6.12 3.51*** 6.10 
LEVt -6.48*** -4.03 -6.42*** -3.99 
Firm Sizet 4.95*** 17.15 4.94*** 17.09 
SHSEt -1.46* -1.70 -1.44* -1.68 
Overseast -0.46 -0.39 -0.41 -0.35 
Industries Controlled Controlled 
Number of obs  2412 2412 
Number of groups  682 682 
Wald Chi2 854.41*** 845.54*** 
R2 within 25.25% 24.99% 
R2 between 31.55% 31.54% 
R2 overall 35.90% 35.89% 
 
Note: *, **, and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% for z and Chi tests, respectively.   
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Table 8  
Female top-management appointments and subsequent changes to CSR ratings 
 
 
∆CSRt-1,t is the percentage change in a firm’s CSR rating between year t-1 and year t, i.e. (CSRt-CSRt-
1)/CSRt-1;  
 
Appointment is a dummy variable with value one if a female leader is appointed in year t-1; and zero if 
a male leader is appointed in year t-1. Appointment = 1 (n=110 cases) and Appointment = 0 (n=103 
cases).  
 
All other explanatory variables are expressed in ∆ form. For example, ∆FDt-1,t is the change in the 
percentage of female directors between year-ends t-1 and t. Changes in some variables such as Age, 
Overseas, SHSE and industry dummies are excluded because of the constant change in firms’ listing 
age and there being no change in firm’s cross-listed and/or exchange-listed status as well as industry 
categorization over any given two years. The remaining variables are as defined earlier. FD is the 
percentage of female directors; ID is the percentage of independent directors; Board Size measured as 
the natural logarithm of total number of directors; Managerial Size measured as the natural logarithm 
of total number of executive managers; Managerial Ownership is the percentage of managerial 
ownership; State Ownership is the percentage of state ownership; H10 is the Herfindahl index for 
ownership by top-10 shareholders; Qfiid is a dummy variable for firms with QFII investment; ROE is 
return on equity; AGE is the natural logarithm of a firm’s listing age; LEV is leverage ratio; Firm Size is 
measured as the natural logarithm of total assets; SHSE is a dummy variable for firms listed on 
Shanghai Stock Exchange; and Overseas is a dummy for offshore H-share listing. 
 
  
OLS Regression 
 
∆CSRt-1,t 
 
 
Coef. t test Coef. t test 
Constant 0.01 0.42 0.00 0.06 
Appointmentt-1 0.14*** 4.37 0.15*** 4.52 
Appointmentt-1×∆ROEt-2,t-1   0.66** 2.25 
∆FDt-1,t 0.00 0.84 0.00 0.83 
∆IDt-1,t 0.00 -1.07 0.00 -1.13 
∆Dualityt-1,t -0.03 -0.53 -0.03 -0.51 
∆Board Sizet-1,t -0.10 -1.36 -0.11 -1.49 
∆Managerial Sizet-1,t 0.01 0.89 0.01 0.99 
∆Managerial Ownershipt-1,t 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.19 
∆State Ownershipt-1,t 0.00 1.16 0.00 0.76 
∆H10t-1 -0.04 -0.09 -0.12 -0.28 
∆Qfiidt-1,t 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.29 
∆ROEt-2,t-1 0.23* 1.63 -0.15 -0.70 
∆ROEt-1,t -0.05 -0.26 -0.09 -0.50 
∆LEVt-1,t 0.23 0.93 0.12 0.51 
∆Firm Sizet-1,t -0.04 -0.50 0.01 0.10 
Number of obs  213 213 
F test  3.38*** 2.87*** 
Adjusted R2 12.71% 11.70% 
  
Notes:  *, **, and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% for respective t and F tests. 
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Table 9  
Heckman (1976, 1979) adjustment for endogeneity 
 
Heckman (1976, 1979) offers a two-stage estimation remedy to adjust for a self-selection issue brought-on by 
endogeneity. The estimated coefficients in the first stage regression are used to compute an “Inverse Mills’ 
Ratio”. This Ratio features as a further independent variable in a second stage, where a least squares regression is 
performed (see Clougherty, Duso and Muck, 2016 for recent consider review and analysis of applications). 
 
CSR is a firm’s Corporate Social Responsibility reporting rating score. 
 
FCEO is a dummy variable for female CEO or vice-CEO (1=female CEO or vice-CEO; and 0 if both are male); 
FChair is a dummy variable for female Chair or vice-Chair (1=female Chair or vice-Chair; and 0 if both are 
male); Duality is a dummy variable (= 1 if CEO and Chair are the same person; and 0 if not); FD is the 
percentage of female directors; ID is the percentage of independent directors; Board Size measured as the 
natural logarithm of total number of directors; Managerial Size measured as the natural logarithm of total 
number of executive managers; Managerial Ownership is the percentage of managerial ownership; State 
Ownership is the percentage of state ownership; SOE is a dummy variable (=1 for an SOE; and 0 for a Non-
SOE);  H10 is the Herfindahl index for ownership by top-10 Shareholders; Qfiid is a dummy variable for firms 
with QFII investment; ROE is return on equity; AGE is the natural logarithm of a firm’s listing age; LEV is 
leverage ratio; Firm Size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets; SHSE is a dummy variable for firms 
listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange; and Overseas is a dummy for offshore H-share listing. 
 
Heckman two-stage OLS CSR Rating Score 
 
Coef. z test 
Step 1:   
Constant 44.30*** 97.76 
FCEOt-1 2.17*** 4.30 
FChairt-1 -0.37 -0.38 
FDt-1 0.06** 2.41 
Step 2:    
Constant -11.99*** -36.49 
IDt-1 0.01** 2.37 
Dualityt-1 -0.05 -1.46 
Board Sizet-1 0.03 0.45 
Managerial Sizet-1 0.36*** 9.52 
Managerial Ownershipt-1
 
0.00 -1.02 
State Ownershipt-1  0.00 -0.47 
H10t-1 -0.18 -1.37 
Qfiidt-1 0.05 1.11 
ROEt-1 0.04* 1.79 
AGEt -0.17*** -5.36 
LEVt -1.33*** -15.93 
Firm Sizet 0.52*** 34.77 
SHSEt 0.06* 1.90 
Overseast 0.58*** 6.42 
Industries Controlled 
No. of obs 8102 
Censored obs 5687 
Inverse-Mills Ratio (λ) -11.75 
Wald Chi2 31.28*** 
ρ -0.81 
σ 14.56 
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Notes:  *, **, and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% for respective z and Chi tests, respectively. 
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Appendix 1a 
Descriptive statistics for SOEs versus non-SOEs 
 
SOE is a dummy variable (= 1 for an SOE; and 0 for a non-SOE). 
FCEO is a dummy variable for female CEO or vice-CEO (1=female CEO or vice-CEO; and 0 if both are male); FChair is a dummy variable for female Chair or vice-Chair (1=female 
Chair or vice-Chair; and 0 if both are male); FCEO1 is a dummy variable for female CEO (1=female CEO and 0 for a male CEO); FChair1 is a dummy variable for female Chair (1=female 
Chair; and 0 for a male CEO); FD is the percentage of female directors; ID is the percentage of independent directors; Duality is a dummy variable (= 1 if CEO and Chair are the same 
person; and 0 if not); Board Size measured as the natural logarithm of total number of directors; Managerial Size measured as the natural logarithm of total number of executive managers; 
Managerial Ownership is the percentage of managerial ownership; State Ownership is the percentage of state ownership; H10 is the Herfindahl index for ownership by top-10 
Shareholders; Qfiid is a dummy variable for firms with QFII investment; ROE is return on equity; AGE is the natural logarithm of a firm’s listing age; LEV is leverage ratio; Firm Size is 
measured as the natural logarithm of total assets; SHSE is a dummy variable for firms listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange; and Overseas is a dummy for offshore H-share listing. 
 
 SOE=1 SOE=0 t test for differences in means 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Min Max Obs Mean Median Std. Min Max 
FCEOt-1 3448 0.27 0.00 0.44 0.00 1.00 4654 0.36 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 -9.06*** 
FChairt-1 3448 0.04 0.00 0.19 0.00 1.00 4654 0.08 0.00 0.27 0.00 1.00 -7.79*** 
FCEO1t-1 3448 0.06 0.00 0.24 0.00 1.00 4654 0.11 0.00 0.31 0.00 1.00 -7.19*** 
FChair1t-1 3448 0.03 0.00 0.18 0.00 1.00 4654 0.05 0.00 0.22 0.00 1.00 -4.29*** 
FDt-1 3448 9.45 9.00 9.74 0.00 56.00 4654 12.55 11.00 11.67 0.00 71.00 -12.65*** 
IDt-1 3448 35.48 33.00 6.54 8.00 75.00 4654 35.71 33.00 6.61 0.00 80.00 -1.60 
Dualityt-1 3448 0.26 0.00 0.44 0.00 1.00 4654 0.39 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 -12.64*** 
Board Sizet-1 3448 2.33 2.30 0.24 1.61 3.22 4654 2.24 2.20 0.24 1.39 3.26 17.29*** 
Managerial Sizet-1 3448 1.90 1.95 0.41 0.00 3.81 4654 1.77 1.79 0.45 0.00 3.33 13.30*** 
Managerial Ownershipt-1 3448 0.22 0.00 2.32 0.00 60.00 4654 6.00 0.00 17.03 0.00 100.00 -19.81*** 
State Ownershipt-1 3448 45.35 44.94 15.32 19.59 100.00 4654 1.99 0.00 4.62 0.00 19.89 180.00*** 
H10t-1  3448 0.21 0.19 0.13 0.00 0.76 4654 0.14 0.10 0.12 0.00 0.80 27.61*** 
Qfiidt-1 3448 0.10 0.00 0.31 0.00 1.00 4654 0.07 0.00 0.26 0.00 1.00 4.55*** 
ROEt-1 3448 0.07 0.09 0.40 -9.91 5.73 4654 0.10 0.09 0.95 -11.27 33.83 1.32 
Aget 3448 11.48 12.00 4.57 1.00 23.00 4654 11.25 12.00 5.24 1.00 23.00 2.11*** 
LEVt 3448 0.55 0.56 0.20 0.01 1.00 4654 0.50 0.50 0.22 0.00 1.00 9.65*** 
Firm Sizet 3448 22.40 22.08 1.67 13.08 30.49 4654 21.47 21.42 1.41 10.84 28.80 27.11*** 
SHSEt 3448 0.77 1.00 0.42 0.00 1.00 4654 0.36 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 40.81*** 
OVERSEASt 3448 0.08 0.00 0.27 0.00 1.00 4654 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.00 1.00 16.00*** 
 
Note: *, **, and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% for t test. 
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Appendix 1b 
Correlation analysis 
 
CSR is a firm’s Corporate Social Responsibility reporting rating score. 
FCEO is a dummy variable for female CEO or vice-CEO (1=female CEO or vice-CEO; and 0 if both are male); FChair is a dummy variable for female Chair or vice-Chair (1=female 
Chair or vice-Chair; and 0 if both are male); Duality is a dummy variable (= 1 if CEO and Chair are the same person; and 0 if not); FD is the percentage of female directors; ID is the 
percentage of independent directors; Board Size measured as the natural logarithm of total number of directors; Managerial Size measured as the natural logarithm of total number of 
executive managers; Managerial Ownership is the percentage of managerial ownership; H10 is the Herfindahl index for ownership by top-10 Shareholders; Foreign is the percentage of 
ownership hold by foreign shareholders including QFIIs, B shares, H shares and foreign legal person shares; Qfiid is a dummy variable for firms with QFII investment; ROE is return on 
equity; AGE is the natural logarithm of a firm’s listing age; LEV is leverage ratio; Firm Size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets; SHSE is a dummy variable for firms listed 
on Shanghai Stock Exchange; and Overseas is a dummy for offshore H-share listing. 
 
  CSR FCEO FChair FD ID  Duality  BS MS MO SO SOE H10 Qfiid ROE AGE LEV Firm Size SHSE 
FCEO 0.09                                   
  (0.00)                                   
FChair 0.00 0.14 
     
 
            (0.82) (0.00) 
     
 
          FD  0.00 0.22 0.30 
    
 
            (0.83) (0.00) (0.00) 
    
 
          ID  0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.01 
   
 
            (0.26) (0.95) (0.09) (0.36) 
   
 
          Duality  0.02 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.01 
  
 
            (0.25) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.40) 
  
 
          Board Size (BS) 0.29 0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.31 -0.03 
 
 
            (0.00) (0.55) (0.23) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
 
 
          Managerial Size (MS) 0.26 0.14 -0.05 -0.07 0.00 0.03 0.20  
           (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.91) (0.02) (0.00)   
         Managerial Ownership (MO) -0.05 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.15 -0.09 -0.05 
            (0.02) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.44) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
          State Ownership (SO) 0.17 -0.11 -0.08 -0.15 -0.01 -0.15 0.20 0.15 -0.21 
           (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.57) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
         SOE 0.13 -0.10 -0.08 -0.14 -0.02 -0.14 0.19 0.15 -0.22 0.58 
          (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
        H10 0.19 -0.08 -0.03 -0.10 0.04 -0.08 0.05 0.09 -0.07 0.46 0.29 
         (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
       Qfiid 0.06 0.03 0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.05 0.05 0.05 
        (0.01) (0.01) (0.60) (0.00) (0.85) (0.33) (0.00) (0.00) (0.30) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
      ROE 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02 
       (0.00) (0.79) (0.92) (0.89) (0.07) (0.98) (0.64) (0.00) (0.29) (0.49) (0.19) (0.16) (0.17) 
     AGE -0.10 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 -0.08 -0.03 -0.24 -0.32 -0.02 0.02 -0.17 -0.02 -0.01 
      (0.00) (0.63) (0.93) (0.00) (0.72) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.03) (0.00) (0.09) (0.45) 
    LEV 0.20 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.12 0.01 -0.13 0.09 0.11 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.18 
     (0.00) (0.16) (0.50) (0.11) (0.78) (0.00) (0.00) (0.43) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.71) (0.22) (0.01) (0.00) 
   Firm Size 0.57 0.01 -0.05 -0.13 0.03 -0.06 0.32 0.35 -0.13 0.34 0.29 0.33 0.15 0.04 -0.02 0.29 
    (0.00) (0.64) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.00) 
  SHSE 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.09 0.12 0.02 -0.19 0.40 0.41 0.06 0.04 -0.01 0.12 0.14 0.20 
   (0.01) (0.03) (0.52) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.58) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 Overseas  0.34 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.14 -0.05 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.06 0.01 -0.09 0.09 0.40 0.13 
  (0.00) (0.44) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.77) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.31) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Note: P values are reported in parentheses.  
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Appendix 2 
Female-led firm effects (FCEO1 and FChair1) across SOE and non-SOEs 
 
 
CSR is a firm’s Corporate Social Responsibility rating score.  
 
FCEO1 is a dummy variable for female CEO (1=female CEO and 0 for a male CEO); FChair1 is a dummy 
variable for female Chair (1=female Chair; and 0 for a male CEO); FD is the percentage of female directors; ID 
is the percentage of independent directors; Duality is a dummy variable for the role duality of CEO and board 
chair (1=if CEO and Chair are the same person; 0 if not); Board Size measured as the natural logarithm of total 
number of directors; Managerial Size measured as the natural logarithm of total number of executive managers; 
Managerial Ownership is the percentage of managerial ownership; Managerial Ownership2 is squared term of 
Managerial Ownership; SOE is a dummy variable (=1 for an SOE; and 0 for a Non-SOE);  H10 is the 
Herfindahl index for ownership by top-10 shareholders; Qfiid is a dummy variable for firms with QFII 
investment; ROE is return on equity; AGE is the natural logarithm of a firm’s listing age; LEV is leverage ratio; 
Firm Size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets; SHSE is a dummy variable for firms listed on 
Shanghai Stock Exchange; and Overseas is a dummy for offshore H-share listing. 
 
 
 CSR rating score  
Simultaneous OLS Regressions SOEs Non-SOEs Chi test for 
differences in 
Coefficients  Coef. t test Coef. t test 
      
Constant -89.93*** -13.49 -56.34*** -7.57 18.30*** 
FCEO1t 1.04 0.53 0.90 0.73 0.00 
FChair1t -2.58 -1.18 2.26 1.37 3.13* 
FDt-1 0.14*** 3.72 0.04* 1.66 4.60** 
IDt-1 0.01 0.28 0.05 1.10 0.31 
Dualityt-1 1.71 1.52 -0.59 -0.78 2.87* 
Board Sizet-1 4.93*** 3.33 0.13 0.09 5.26** 
Managerial Sizet-1 2.05** 2.43 4.40*** 5.71 4.23** 
Managerial Ownershipt-1 0.63 1.08 0.15*** 2.65 0.66 
Managerial Ownershipt-12 -0.04 -1.11 0.00 -1.58 1.15 
H10t-1 2.52 0.91 3.16 1.21 0.03 
Qfiidt-1 -0.66 -0.71 1.27 1.25 1.95 
ROEt-1 1.18 0.58 -6.93*** -2.81 6.44** 
AGEt 0.63 0.78 -1.53** -2.30 4.27** 
LEVt -3.54* -1.76 -10.76*** -6.20 7.35*** 
Firm Sizet 4.21*** 14.72 4.44*** 11.59 0.23 
SHSEt 1.13 1.44 -2.02*** -3.13 9.59*** 
Overseast 0.84 0.76 3.26 1.01 0.50 
Industries Controlled Controlled  
    
Number of obs  1297 1115 2412 
F test  31.95*** 18.67***  
Adjusted R2 43.32% 32.97%  
 
Note: *, **, and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% for t, F and Chi tests, respectively. 
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Highlights 
 Gender diversity on boards promotes Chinese firms’ social performance. 
 The appointment of female officers to top-level management positions improves CSR 
ratings. 
 Even higher ratings emerge in firms with gender diverse boards and female leaders. 
 Social ratings are increasing in foreign ownership levels. 
 QFII-invested SOEs and non-SOEs appear little different in terms of social rating.  
 Ratings display negative (positive) relation with a firm’s lagged financial performance and 
leverage (size and age). 
 Ratings have little to no link with independent non-executive board director (INED) 
presence. 
